In exchange for IMF lending, governments surrender some sovereignty, self-determination of their economic policies, and implicitly admit that the government, on its own, could not manage the travails through which it is going. A lesser-known but also costly trade-off is that the IMF imposes significant surcharges – akin to the penalty rates imposed by banks – on countries with large borrowings from the IMF that are not paid back within a relatively short time. Indeed, IMF surcharges are pro-cyclical financial penalties imposed on countries precisely at a time when they can least afford them. This brief note examines the economic implications of the surcharges from a global distributive perspective. In so doing, the authors stress the need to eliminate excessive surcharges in the COVID-19 era and call for a more fundamental reform of IMF financing.
Patrick Rey
Principal-agent models take outside options, determining participation and incentive constraints, as given.
- 07/24/2024
- Working Paper