Joseph Stiglitz
Andrew KosenkoWe study the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of competitive insurance markets with endogenous information disclosure by both firms and consumers. We show that an equilibrium always exists, (even without the single crossing property), and characterize the unique equilibrium allocation. With two types of consumers the outcome is particularly simple, consisting of a pooling allocation which maximizes the well-being of the low risk individual (along the zero profit pooling line) plus a supplemental (undisclosed and nonexclusive) contract that brings the high risk individual to full insurance (at his own odds). We show that this outcome is extremely robust and Pareto efficient.
Remarks by Martín Guzmán at 12th Edition of the Paris Forum: Key findings and conclusions of the Jubilee Report
Dear members of the Paris Club Secretariat, Thank you for the invitation to present some of the key findings and conclusions of the Jubilee Report, commissioned by Pope Francis and prepared by a Commission of
José Antonio Ocampo
Martín Guzmán