Moral Hazard and Unemployment in Competitive Equilibrium

We construct a general equilibrium model where workers’ reservation wages and the maximum punishment acceptable before workers quit are instead determined endogenously. We simultaneously extend the standard effort efficiency-wage model by incorporating noisy signals, labor market frictions, and the possibility of performance-based pay, analyzing the equilibrium response to an adverse signal, and establishing conditions under which equilibrium entails lowering wages (performance contracting) rather than firing. We provide a complete analysis of the general equilibrium comparative statics, showing, for instance, that frictions (sand-in-the-wheels) may decrease unemployment and that the equilibrium is determined by two simple aggregates which depend on the parameters of the economy, interpretable as the intercept and slope of a pseudo-labor supply curve, embedding all the binding constraints (e.g., the no-shirking and labor market participation constraints). We also show that there may exist only a firing equilibrium, a no-firing equilibrium, multiple (firing and no-firing) equilibria, and no pure-strategy equilibrium. The economy is, in general, not efficient either in the selection of the form of equilibrium or the wages paid within any type of equilibrium. We discuss welfare enhancing government interventions, including publicly provided sand-in-the-wheels.