The potential adverse effects for global economic, political, and social stability that the lack of these frameworks implies make their design and implementation a matter of urgencya claim that has been recently endorsed by a resolution of the United Nations.
The International Monetary Fund recognized the need for implementing these frameworks in 2001.
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Over the past fifteen years discussions have explored many alternatives, and their economic, political, and social consequences. Each has to be evaluated in terms of ex ante incentives is there, in some sense too much or too little lending? How is lending distributed across countries? Is lending done on the right terms? Do the lenders have the right incentives for due diligence? And do the borrowers for prudent lending? as well as ex post incentives: when a problem occurs, are there incentives for a timely resolution, without undue delay? Are there incentives for a fair and efficient resolution, one that enables the indebted country to return to growth quickly, which does not impose undue hardship on its citizens, and provides fair compensation to the creditors?
Some have suggested that simple modifications of the current contractual approach are all that is required. Others claim that some sovereign debt restructuring mechanism would be desirable.
This conference brought together academics and other experts, to discuss these issues and provide guidance on (a) what kinds of contractual reforms would facilitate a better working of sovereign debt markets? (b) What are the limits of the private contractual approach? What are the benefits and limits of a statutory approach? Do contractual approaches help address the problems posed by these limitations? How might these be structured in order to promote a more efficient and equitable market for international debt? Are there intermediate approaches, involving soft law, that might facilitate the functioning of sovereign debt markets?
More generally, the conference sought insights on how the market-based approach can be complemented by a legal framework that replicates the functions of a national bankruptcy court.
- Patrick Bolton
Commentator
Barbara and David Zalaznick Professor of Business
Columbia University Business School - Lee Buchheit
Commentator
Honorary Professor
University of Edinburgh Law School
University Of Edinburgh - Martin Guzman
Commentator
Co-President
Initiative for Policy Dialogue (IPD) - Sean Hagan
Commentator
Professor from Practice
Georgetown Law School
Georgetown University - Jim Haley
Commentator
Senior Fellow
CIGI - Barry Herman
Commentator
Visiting Senior Fellow, Graduate Program
International Affairs
The New School - Jurgen Kaiser
Commentator
Policy Coordinator
erlassjahr.de - Domenico Lombardi
Commentator
Director
Global Economy Program
CIGI - José Antonio Ocampo
Commentator
Professor of Professional Practice at Columbia University and former Minister of Finance of Colombia
Columbia University
- Kunibert Raffer
Commentator
Associate Professor
Department of Economics
University of Vienna - Benu Schneider
Commentator
Research Fellow
Overseas Development Institute - Shari Spiegel
Commentator
Senior Economic Affairs Officer
UN DESA - Joseph Stiglitz
Commentator
President
Initiative for Policy Dialogue (IPD) - Jan Svejnar
Commentator
James T. Shotwell Professor of Global Political Economy; Director, Center on Global Economic Governance
School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University - Marilou Uy
Commentator
Senior Fellow
Global Economic Governance Initiative
Boston University - Sergio Chodos
Commentator
Executive Director for Argentina and Bernardo Lischinsky, Senior Advisor to Executive Director
IMF - Hugh Bredenkamp
Commentator
IMF - Richard Conn
Commentator
Managing Partner
Innovative Partners LLC