Ray of Hope? China and the Rise of Solar Energy

Columbia

New Thinking in Industrial Policy Conference

Ignacio Banares-Sanchez¹, Robin Burgess¹, David Laszlo¹, Pol Simpson¹, John Van Reenen¹²³, **Yifan Wang**¹

¹ London School of Economics ² MIT ³ NBER

November 7, 2025

Outline

- Introduction
- 2 Background
- 3 Data
- 4 Results

Outline


- Introduction
- Background
- O Data
- Results

Clean energy essential to curbing emissions

- Around 73% of global greenhouse gas emissions are attributed to the energy sector
- Decarbonisation plans for many sectors reliant on electrification and therefore clean energy
- Emissions will grow if developing countries meet growing energy demand with fossil fuels
- China plays a particularly important role: the world's largest emitter and the leading innovator in clean energy technologies

Cost of solar has fallen dramatically

Figure: Global average price of solar PV modules (in 2019 US\$ per Watt)



Source: LaFond et al. (2017) & IRENA Database

This Paper: Study impact of local subsidies on Chinese solar industry

- Evaluate contribution of Chinese (place-based) industrial policy to this growth
- Retrieve policy text data from **PKULaw Database** (universe of laws and regulations in China, Wang and Yang, 2021) to classify solar subsidies: Production, Innovation, and Demand/installation (cf. Juhasz et al., 2022)
- Gather rich new micro-data on universe of solar panel manufacturers in China & including their production (in MWh) from ENF. Match to business register, patents (SIPO, PATSTAT, etc.), customs (exports), Orbis (revenue, labor, capital, productivity), ASIE (some explicit subsidy data), etc.

Preview of Empirical Results

- Innovation & Production subsidy policies both generate more city-wide solar innovation (e.g. citation weighted patents)
- Policies also increased solar firm numbers, production, revenues, exports and productivity
- Local impacts weaker for **demand subsidy** policies, likely because panels can be sourced from other Chinese cities (cf. German feed-in tariffs after 2000)

Preview of Quantitative Results

- Findings consistent with a new model we develop that integrates multi-region energy demand, heterogeneous manufacturers with endogenous entry/exit, R&D decisions.
- Compared to the no-subsidy counterfactual scenario
 - Subsidies explain 40% of price drop
 - Lead to 13% consumer welfare gain
 - Brings monetary benefit that is 60% higher than the cost
- Policy generates positive gains for China even without accounting for environmental benefits


Some Existing Literature

- Industrial Policy: Theory: Eaton & Grossman (1986); Rodrik (2004); Harrison & Rodriguez-Clare (2010) survey; Liu (2019); Bartelme et al. (2021), Buera et al. (2013); Itskhoki & Moll (2019); Murphy et al. (1989)
- Industrial Policy: Empirics (inc. LBD): Lane (2020, 2021); Criscuolo et al. (2019); Juhasz et al. (2022); Choi & Levchenko (2021); Choi & Shim (2022); Levitt et al. (2013); Liu & Ma (2022)
- (Green) Directed Technical Change: Acemoglu et al. (2012, 2016, 2019); Aghion et al. (2016); Arkolakis & Walsh (2023); Newell et al. (1999); Popp (2022, 2019); Shapiro & Walker (2018)
- Chinese Growth & Policy: Branstetter & Li (2024), Kalouptsidi (2018); Barwick et al. (2019, 2021); Aghion et al. (2015); Bai et al. (2019); Chen & Xie (2019); Wang & Yang (2021), Song et al. (2011); Konig et al. (2022); Wei et al. (2023); Branstetter et al. (2022); Wu et al. (2019)
- Solar: Ball et al. (2017); Bollinger & Gillingham (2021); Gerarden (2022); Gillingham & Tsvetanov (2019); Gonzales, Ito & Reguant (2023); de Groote & Verboven (2019); Nemet (2019)
- Technology and Trade: Melitz & Redding (2023); Bustos (2011); Coelli et al. (2020); Aghion et al. (2017)
- Place-Based Policies: Moretti (2011, 2012); Kline (2010); Gruber & Johnson (2019); Greenstone et al. (2010); Kline & Moretti (2014)

Outline

- Introduction
- 2 Background
- O Data
- Results


Huge fall in cost of solar relative to other energy sources (1880-2020)



Source: Way, Ives, Mealy and Farmer (2021) "Empirically grounded technology forecasts and the energy transition"


Renewable electricity capacity, especially solar, has grown rapidly...

Figure: World electricity production by source




China's global share of solar production rose from near zero to more than 80% in 2021

Figure: Share of Annual Solar Photovoltaics Cell Production in Leading Countries, 2000-2021



China is not just imitating: Citation-Weighted Solar Patents

Figure: Cite-weighted solar patents



Note: Total yearly citations are divided by the number of years since the patent's filing to adjust for differences in the number of years when patents can be cited.

Source: PATSTAT database: Patents by priority date in all patent offices.

Here: patent counts (subsidy in black circles)




Here: patent counts (subsidy in black circles)



Here: patent counts (subsidy in black circles)



Here: patent counts (subsidy in black circles)




Here: patent counts (subsidy in black circles)



Here: patent counts (subsidy in black circles)




Here: patent counts (subsidy in black circles)



Here: patent counts (subsidy in black circles)




Here: patent counts (subsidy in black circles)




Here: patent counts (subsidy in black circles)




Here: patent counts (subsidy in black circles)




Here: patent counts (subsidy in black circles)




Here: patent counts (subsidy in black circles)




Here: patent counts (subsidy in black circles)




Here: patent counts (subsidy in black circles)




Here: patent counts (subsidy in black circles)




Here: patent counts (subsidy in black circles)




Here: patent counts (subsidy in black circles)



Here: patent counts (subsidy in black circles)



Here: patent counts (subsidy in black circles)



Much of this industrial policy was led by local government

- Industry histories suggest important role of local government (Ball et al. 2017; Chen, 2016)
- City governments have significant policy autonomy (Text of policy documents makes this clear)
- City governments have budget to implement meaningful industrial policies (Bai, Hsieh, and Song, 2019)
- Local bureaucrats have strong incentives to promote economic growth e.g. career concerns (Jia et al. 2015; Li and Zhou, 2005)

Outline

- Introduction
- Background
- 3 Data
- Results


Measure solar industrial policy using PKULaw Database

Table: City-level solar policies

Type of policy	Number	Example
Subsidy	78	
1. Production subsidy	27	"The cost of a new solar production line built in Hefei will be subsidized by 12% (2018)"
2. Innovation subsidy	12	"Firms will be awarded 10,000 RMB if they earn provincial level R&D center certification (Guilin, 2011)"
3. Demand subsidy	61	"1 RMB per watt for the electricity generated by solar projects installed in Beijing (2010)"

Source: Use keywords to extract solar policies from PKULaw data

Measure the outcomes of solar panel manufacturers



Aggregating the firm data gives us outcomes at the city-year level

- Innovation: All patents filed by solar firms in city-year (text, citations, etc.) [Example patents]


- **Revenues**: Total revenues (and employment, capital, etc.)
- Production capacity: Total MWh capacity of all solar panels manufactured
- Firm count: Number of solar firms
- **Exports**: Total Exports (values, volume, etc.)



Outline

- Introduction
- Background
- O Data
- 4 Results

Results: Patents, Any subsidy



Notes: SDID on 358 cities with 43 treated. Cohort-year specific ATTs aggregated into event studies. Outcome: IHS of patents by solar firms in a city-year.

Treatment is any subsidy. 95% SE cluster bootstrapped by city.





Results: Patents


Table: Patent Counts (Aggregate ATT)

	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy	
All patents	0.496**	0.236	0.871***	1.060***	
	(0.200)	(0.275)	(0.227)	(0.367)	
Observations	6,086	6,086	6,086	6,086	

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. SDID estimates on 358 cities 2004–2020. Outcome is IHS of production capacity of solar firms in a city-year pair.



Results: Production Capacity, Any subsidy



Notes: SDID on 358 cities with 43 treated (2004-2013). Cohort-year specific ATTs aggregated into event studies. Outcome: IHS of total panel production capacity MWh by solar firms in a city-year.

Treatment is any subsidy. 95% SE cluster bootstrapped by city.

2007 - IHS




Results: Production Capacity

Table: Solar Panel Production Capacity (Aggregate ATT)

			, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	,
	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy
Panel production	2.098***	0.587	2.496***	2.930***
	(0.532)	(0.467)	(0.575)	(0.773)
Observations	3,580	3,580	3,580	3,580

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. SDID estimates on 358 cities 2004-2013. Outcome is IHS of production capacity of solar firms in a city-year pair.

Results: Revenue



Notes: SDID on 358 cities with 43 treated. Cohort-year specific ATTs aggregated into event studies. Outcome: IHS of total revenue by solar firms in a city-year.

Treatment is any subsidy. 95% SE cluster bootstrapped by city. 2004-2020.





Results: Revenue


Table: Revenue (Aggregate ATT)

	table treatment (trigging and trial)				
	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy	
Revenue	0.994**	0.060	1.772***	2.502***	
	(0.448)	(0.278)	(0.615)	(0.819)	
Observations	6,086	6,086	6,086	6,086	

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. SDID estimates on 358 cities 2004–2020. Outcome is IHS of production capacity of solar firms in a city-year pair.



Results: Firm Count, Any subsidy



Notes: SDID on 358 cities with 43 treated. Cohort-year specific ATTs aggregated into event studies. Outcome: IHS of total number of solar firms in a city-year.

Treatment is any subsidy. 95% SE cluster bootstrapped by city. 2004-2020.

2007 - IHS




Results: Firm Count

Table: Firm Count - Number of Solar Firms (Aggregate ATT)

	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy
Firm count	0.212**	0.031	0.377**	0.412***
	(0.096)	(0.038)	(0.155)	(0.148)
Observations	6,086	6,086	6,086	6,086

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. SDID estimates on 358 cities 2004-2020. Outcome is IHS of count of solar firms in a city-year pair.

Results: Solar exports, Any subsidy



Notes: SDID on 358 cities with 43 treated. Cohort-year specific ATTs aggregated into event studies. Outcome: IHS of total solar export value of solar firms in a city-year.

Treatment is any subsidy. 95% SE cluster bootstrapped by city. 2004-2016.

2007 - IHS



Results: Solar exports

Table: Solar exports (Aggregate ATT)

	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					
	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy		
Solar export value	3.192***	1.153	4.298***	6.092**		
	(1.231)	(1.145)	(1.498)	(2.366)		
Observations	4,654	4,654	4,654	4,654		

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Solar exports classified via HS6. SDID on 358 cities 2004-2016. Outcome is IHS.



Extensions & Robustness

- Productivity productivity results
- Pollution PM_{2.5} results
- Placebos on GDP, non-solar patents, etc. Placebo
- Adding controls to SDID (GDP, population, income, tax revenue, ...) results with controls
- Total solar patents (including universities, non-solar firms, etc.) City-level patents
- Adjustment based on factory locations
- Compositional change and dynamic effects (results for cohorts between 2007 and 2013)
- Results in levels, etc. (e.g. Chen and Roth, 2022) results in levels
- Subsidy Cost


Results

Table: PM_{2.5} concentration (Levels, Aggregate ATT)

	(1)	(6)	(0)	(4)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy
PM 2.5 concentration	-0.611	-1.192***	-0.167	-0.161
	(0.441)	(0.581)	(0.394)	(0.584)
Observations	6,086	6,086	6,086	6,086
Mean of Dep. var.	38.58	38.58	38.58	38.58

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. The LHS variable is annual average $\mu g/m^3$ concentration of PM $_{2.5}$ at 0.1 \times 0.1 degree resolution. From this, we calculate area-weighted averages. The source is the V5.GL.02 data set.

Modelling Counterfactuals: Different Path




Modelling Counterfactuals: Different Path




Modelling Counterfactuals: Consumer Welfare

Aggregate Welfare



Modelling Counterfactuals: Net Benefit Relative to Subsidy Cost




Conclusions

- New and comprehensive database on the Chinese solar industry and local solar industrial policy
- China's local solar production and innovation subsidies are effective at stimulating local solar industry (innovation, firm numbers, revenue, production, exports)
- Theoretical model's predictions consistent with empirical analysis
- Large gain compared to no subsidy counterfactuals. Largest when we have full innovation subsidy.

Appendix


Citations








Triadic patents








Technological Frontier




		₹ Region		No. of Known Sellers	Power Range(Wp)
1st Sunergy		🔀 United States			175-290
2ES		France	15		135-150
2Power		ermany	50	1	215-325
3D Energy	€	■ Italy	20		200-450
3G-Solar		ermany			155-300
3Hz Solar		[China			140-540
3KM Power		[China			410
3S	€	[China	300	1	40-600
3S Swiss Solar Solutions		Mark Switzerland		1	115-200
5Star Solar		[China		1	240-370
8.33 Solar		Spain		5	270-345
A. D. Global Synergles		India			3-300
A.R.E.		Egypt			325-340
Abba		■ Italy			230-300
Abow Power		China			5-350
ABi-Solar		Inited States		18	275-470
Abotree Solar		China			0.3-360
Abshine		China	100		255-270
Access Solar		India	Back	1	2.220










Spatial concentration of the Chinese solar industry



Spatial concentration of the Chinese solar industry



Solar PV in the Chinese government's Five-Year Plans

2001-2005 Tenth Five-Year Plan:

- Solar a targeted sector for first time, together with other renewable energies.
- In 2001 no solar industry.
- In 2005 considerable growth.

2006-2010 Eleventh Five-Year Plan:

- Solar industry as an opportunity to attain technological leadership.
- Included funding for R&D and manufacturing development for the first time.
- Solar industry witnessed exceptional growth

• 2011-2015 Twelfth Five-Year Plan:

- Government kept pushing for solar adoption, supply-chain expansion and indigenous R&D.
- R&D goals gained in detail and scope


2016-2020 Thirteenth Five-Year Plan:

- Targeting capacity and R&D expansion, as well as industry-wide cost-reduction.
- Includes Thirteenth Five Year Plan for Solar Energy Development.






Renewable electricity capacity, especially solar, has grown rapidly



The productivity thresholds in the data

Figure: Number of firms (ASIE) in each group



Note: Firm-level data from ASIE, merged with SIPO.

Optimal Profits (3 regimes)

$$\pi_{o,s}(\varphi) = \max \left\{ \sum_{d \neq \tilde{d}} \left\{ p_{od,s}(\varphi) q_{od,s}(\varphi) - w_o \frac{\tau_{od,s} a_{o,s} q_{od,s}(\varphi)}{\varphi} \right\} - w_o f_{o,s}, \right.$$

$$\left. \sum_{d} \left\{ p_{od,s}(\varphi) q_{od,s}(\varphi) - w_o \frac{\tau_{od,s} a_{o,s} q_{od,s}(\varphi)}{\varphi} - w_o f_{o,\tilde{d},s}^x \right\} - w_o f_{o,s}, \right.$$

$$\left. \sum_{d} \left\{ p_{od,s}(\varphi) q_{od,s}(\varphi) - w_o \frac{\tau_{od,s} a_{o,s} q_{od,s}(\varphi)}{\xi_{o,s} \varphi} - w_o f_{o,\tilde{d},s}^x \right\} - w_o f_{o,s} - w_o \phi_{o,s} f_{o,s}^i \right\}$$

Back to thresholds




LBD-Patent: Patent as process innovation

Grid Line Structure for Solar Cell manufacturing (CN104752533A)

This invention comprises metal wires and conductive silver paste. The grid line is woven from metal wires, with a layer of silver paste applied to the metal wires which ensures excellent adhesion between the silver paste and the metal wires as well as strong ohmic contact between the sub-grid line and the silicon wafer. The silver paste used for the main grid line does not contain glass material, which ensures good adhesion between the main grid line and the silicon wafer and reduces the recombination of minority carriers under the main grid line.

Compared with the prior art, the present invention greatly reduces the amount of (expensive) silver paste used generating big cuts in production costs. It ensures excellent aspect ratios of the grid lines, eliminating the possibility of broken lines and false prints, thereby improving the photovoltaic conversion efficiency of the solar cell, and being suitable for large-scale industrial production.




Back to Data Section Back to Results Section

LBD-Patent: Patent as process innovation

Transfer Assembly of a Solar Cell (CN208706675U)

The utility model discloses a transfer assembly of a solar cell piece with a metal-stacked electrode. The assembly comprises a trolley body, a storage member arranged on the top of the trolley body, and a positioning component arranged on the storage member. A plurality of slots are opened on the storage member, and a storage plate is slidably connected in each slot. The top of the storage plate is provided with a groove, a spring is provided on the inner wall of each slot, the spring is connected to the storage plate, a first connecting hole is opened on the storage plate, and a second connecting hole penetrating all the slots is opened on the storage member. The positioning component includes a support column, a crossbar, a pulley, a rope, a motor, a limit rod, and a sliding block. The utility model delivers the solar cell piece through the newly designed transfer assembly. The structure is simple, easy to install and transport, and will not damage the solar cell piece during transportation, reducing the defect rate and ensuring product quality.






Non-LBD Patent

Road Cliff Lighting Device (CN212273899U)

This utility model patent relates to a road cliff photovoltaic lighting device, which includes a road cliff stone or road guardrail connected to the outer surface of a photovoltaic component. The photovoltaic component is connected to the inverter and battery through a controller in sequence, and the controller is connected to the light strip. The light strip is located on one side of the road cliff stone or road quardrail facing the center of the road. By combining the photovoltaic power generation system with the road cliff or guardrail lighting. photovoltaic power generation, which serves as green energy, is closely integrated with transportation, solving the power supply and subsequent maintenance problems of traditional road lighting and reducing construction and maintenance costs. It also produces an uninterrupted power supply to indicate the road dividing lines and boundary lines, guiding the passage of vehicles and pedestrians, relieving driving fatigue and beautifying the road.



Yifan Wang

Non-LBD Patent

New Phosphide Material

The present invention provides a carbon-doped P-type gallium phosphide material, in which carbon is used as the doping element of the P-type gallium phosphide semiconductor material. The preparation method of the material is to use metal organic chemical vapor deposition technology, introduce organic gallium source and phosphorus source into the reaction chamber, let them decompose at high temperature, and react on the surface of the substrate to produce gallium phosphide material. During the generation of gallium phosphide material, carbon impurities are introduced by inputting substances containing carbon elements, or by utilising carbon atoms generated by the organic gallium source during thermal decomposition. In the present invention, carbon replaces Mg or Zn. Since carbon doping has a small diffusion coefficient and stable properties, highly doped GaP materials can be produced, which are characterised by high efficiency, low diffusion, and high stability.

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Sample Size
SIPO, 2004-2020, 358 cities:			
Total patents by solar firms	13.1	111.3	6,086
Design patents	1.2	10.4	6,086
Utility model and invention patents	11.9	102.8	6,086
Orbis and Qichacha, 358 cities:			
Total number of solar firms, 2004-2020	2.9	10.2	6,086
Total revenue of solar firms, RMB, billions, 2004-2020	0.218	1.38	6,086
Customs, 358 cities:			
Total export value of solar firms, millions USD, 2004-2016	24.8	186	4,654
Total export volume of solar firms, millions, 2004-2015	3.18	43.7	4,296
Average export price of solar firms, USD, 2004-2015	9,716	480,762	4,296

Notes: Each observation is city-year pair. There are up to 358 cities between 2004 and 2020 (6,086 observations), but different datasets may have lower numbers of observations as noted in the table. The revenue numbers are adjusted to account for multi-product firms.


Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Sample Size
ENF, 2004-2013, 358 cities:			·
Total Solar Panel capacity, MWh	82.4	483.3	3,580
Total Solar Panel production, MWh	40.7	265.5	3,580
Total Solar Cell capacity, MWh	50.8	353.4	3,580
Total Solar Cell production, MWh	31.3	233.0	3,580
Total Number of Solar Panel firms	0.9	3.5	3,580
Total Number of Solar Cell firms	0.2	1.0	3,580
Statistics Yearbook, 2004-2020, 284 cities:			
GDP, billion RMB	196.0	307.2	4,828
Population, thousand	4,453	3,176	4,828
GDP per capita, RMB	43,497	46,936	4,828

Notes: Each observation is city-year pair. There are up to 358 cities between 2004 and 2020 (6,086 observations), but different datasets may have lower numbers of observations as noted in the table.

Back to Data Section


Validation with ASIE



Notes: The axis is the log(assets) in the ASIE data set, and the y-axis is the log(assets) in the Orbis data set. Each point is one firm in one year. If we fit a linear line, the coefficient is 1.01, p_i 0.01, and R^2 = 0.9679

Results: 2007 cohort, Patents

Figure: Number of patents by solar firms - Any subsidy (2007 example)




Notes: SDID on 358 cities, 3 (Jonzhou, Xinju & Yangzhou) introduced policy in 2007. Outcome: IHS of patents by solar firms in a city-year. SE cluster bootstrapped by city.




Results: 2007 cohort raw trends, Patents

Figure: Number of patents by solar firms for the treated and control group in 2007




Results: 2007 cohort raw trends, Patents

Figure: Number of patents by solar firms for the three cities treated in 2007



Results: 2013 cohort, Patents

Figure: Patent - Any subsidy (2013 example)




Notes: SDID estimates on 358 cities, focusing on the 3 that introduced a policy in 2013. Outcome IHS of patents by solar firms in a city-year. SE cluster bootstrapped by city.




Results: 2007 cohort, Revenue

Figure: Revenue - Any subsidy (2007 example)




Results: 2007 cohort raw trends, Revenue

Figure: Total revenue by solar firms for the treated and control group in 2007




Results: 2007 cohort raw trends, Revenue

Figure: Total revenue by solar firms for the three cities treated in 2007



Results: 2013 cohort, Revenue

Figure: Revenue - Any subsidy (2013 example)




Notes: SDID estimates on 358 cities, focusing on the 3 that introduced a policy in 2013. Outcome is IHS of revenue of solar firms in a city-year pair. SE cluster bootstrapped by city.




Results: 2007 cohort, Production Capacity

Figure: Panel Production Capacity - Any subsidy (2007 example)



Results: 2007 cohort, Firm count

Figure: Firm Count - Number of Solar Firms - Any subsidy (2007 example)




Notes: SDID estimates on 358 cities, focusing on the 3 that introduced a policy in 2007. Outcome is IHS of number of solar firms in a city-year pair.



Results: 2007 cohort, Solar export value

Figure: Solar export value - Any subsidy (2007 example)



Results: Total exports

Table: Total exports (Aggregate ATT)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy
Export value	2.451**	0.658	3.217**	4.160**
	(1.178)	(1.130)	(1.443)	(2.143)
Observations	4,654	4,654	4,654	4,654

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. SDID on 358 cities 2004-2016. Outcome is IHS.



Table: Productivity (Aggregate ATT)

Panel A	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Period: 2004-2020	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy
Revenue	1.015**	0.069	1.802***	2.563***
	(0.455)	(0.277)	(0.629)	(0.844)
Labor	0.788**	0.042	1.498***	1.815**
	(0.350)	(0.203)	(0.575)	(0.825)
Capital	0.526	-0.186	1.260**	1.712**
	(0.354)	(0.175)	(0.518)	(0.799)
Observations	6,086	6,086	6,086	6,086

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. The revenue, labor and capital numbers are adjusted to account for multi-product firms leveraging firm-level export data



Table: Productivity (Aggregate ATT) cont.

Panel B	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Period: 2004-2013	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy
Revenue	1.776***	0.294	2.221***	2.653***
	(0.570)	(0.209)	(0.654)	(1.017)
Panel production capacity	2.098***	0.587	2.496***	2.930***
	(0.532)	(0.467)	(0.575)	(0.773)
Labor	1.444**	0.139	1.809**	2.049**
	(0.606)	(0.242)	(0.721)	(1.032)
Capital	1.177**	0.103	1.494**	1.792*
	(0.524)	(0.246)	(0.611)	(0.923)
Observations	3,580	3,580	3,580	3,580

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. The revenue, labor and capital numbers are adjusted to account for multi-product firms leveraging firm-level export data



Table: $PM_{2.5}$ concentration (Levels, Aggregate ATT)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy
PM 2.5 concentration	-0.611	-1.192***	-0.167	-0.161
	(0.441)	(0.581)	(0.394)	(0.584)
Observations	6,086	6,086	6,086	6,086
Mean of Dep. var.	38.58	38.58	38.58	38.58

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. The LHS variable is annual average $\mu g/m^3$ concentration of PM_{2.5} at 0.1 x 0.1 degree resolution. From this, we calculate area-weighted averages. The source is the V5. GL.02 data set.



Table: CO₂ EMISSIONS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy
Annual CO ₂ emissions	-0.038**	-0.042*	-0.028	-0.020
	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.028)
Observations	4,872	4,872	4,872	4,872

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Each observation is an admin2 level region and there are 348 admin2 regions in China with available data. Time: 2004-2017. Each column is one SDID regression. The coefficient is the ATT which averages the staggered treatment effect. The outcome variable is annual CO_2 emissions and it is transformed using IHS. Its source is the county-level annual data set of J. Chen et al (2020), which we remap to our admin2 regions. All regressions without controls.





Table: Positive Spillovers outweighs Business Stealing (cf. Bloom, Schankerman & Van Reenen, 2013)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	All patents	Firm count	Revenue	Panel capacity	Solar export value
Any subsidy in an adjacent city	0.373***	0.099	0.617***	0.385	1.099**
	(0.096)	(0.055)	(0.199)	(0.263)	(0.491)
Observations	5,049	5,049	5,049	3,210	3,861

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. The revenue numbers are adjusted to account for multi-product firms leveraging firm-level export data



 Cross-city spillovers positive, but smaller coefficients than own-effects. Also true for other policies.

- Cross-city spillovers positive, but smaller coefficients than own-effects. Also true for other policies.
- Might expect this from demand policies, but supply policies expected to have negative effects through business stealing

- Cross-city spillovers positive, but smaller coefficients than own-effects. Also true for other policies.
- Might expect this from demand policies, but supply policies expected to have negative effects through business stealing
- Suggestive of positive cross-city technological spillovers that outweigh business stealing (see Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen, 2013).

- Cross-city spillovers positive, but smaller coefficients than own-effects. Also true for other policies.
- Might expect this from demand policies, but supply policies expected to have negative effects through business stealing
- Suggestive of positive cross-city technological spillovers that outweigh business stealing (see Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen, 2013).
- Investigating using patent citation patterns and alternative distance metrics.



Other policies: Innocom

- Wei et al. (2023) and Chen et al. (2021) examine Innocom, a major policy which after 2008 increased incentives for patenting and R&D through lower tax
- Had many features which led to low quality patents and relabeling of expenses
- But unlikely that this correlated with solar policies (a time effect). Placebo on non-solar patents show zero effects
- Wei et al. (2023) show many purchases of patents to hit six patents used by bureaucrats as indicator
- We only use first filing. Also examine through dropping firms with a spike at 6 patents.



Table: Controlling for GDP per capita

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy
All patent	0.483**	0.226	0.867***	1.001***
	(0.205)	(0.242)	(0.220)	(0.341)
□ Design patents	0.187	0.275	0.240	0.141
	(0.132)	(0.190)	(0.167)	(0.254)
☐ Invention/utility model patents	0.527**	0.191	0.960***	1.051***
	(0.213)	(0.241)	(0.232)	(0.361)
 Solar patents 	0.523***	0.247	0.802***	0.875***
	(0.191)	(0.230)	(0.204)	(0.339)
 Non-solar patents 	0.254	-0.061	0.739***	0.801**
	(0.182)	(0.215)	(0.217)	(0.349)
Firm count	0.210***	0.030	0.380***	0.396***
	(0.081)	(0.031)	(0.125)	(0.138)
Revenue	1.007***	0.083	1.767***	2.496***
	(0.458)	(0.197)	(0.505)	(0.686)

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. The revenue numbers are adjusted for to account for multi-product firms.





Table: Controlling for GDP per capita (cont.)


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy
Panel capacity	2.025***	0.531	2.415***	2.848***
	(0.466)	(0.428)	(0.470)	(0.705)
Solar export value	4.515***	1.367*	6.250***	8.967***
	(0.970)	(0.741)	(1.428)	(2.136)
Export value	2.409***	0.577	3.210**	4.041**
	(0.886)	(1.009)	(1.292)	(1.992)

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.




Results: Patents, Cohorts between 2007 and 2013

Figure: Total patents, cohorts between 2007 and 2013




Results: Firm count, Cohorts between 2007 and 2013

Figure: Firm count, cohorts between 2007 and 2013




Results: Revenue, Cohorts between 2007 and 2013

Figure: Revenue, cohorts between 2007 and 2013



Results: Panel capacity, Cohorts between 2007 and 2013

Figure: Panel capacity, cohorts between 2007 and 2013



Results: Solar export value, Cohorts between 2007 and 2013

Figure: Solar export value, cohorts between 2007 and 2013




Table: Levels results (Patents)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy
All patents	6.310	-7.076	20.046**	25.613*
	(9.949)	(14.578)	(9.569)	(14.873)
Observations	6,086	6,086	6,086	6,086
Mean of Dep. var.	13.128	13.128	13.128	13.128

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.



Table: Levels results (Revenue)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy
Revenue (million RMB)	135	-0.95	329**	397**
	(123)	(109)	(148)	(179)
Observations	6,086	6,086	6,086	6,086
Mean of Dep. var.	157	157	157	157

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. The revenue numbers are adjusted to account for multi-product firms leveraging firm-level export data



Table: Levels results (Panel capacity)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy
Panel capacity (MWh)	319.567**	138.574	366.728**	480.764***
	(128.377)	(127.902)	(147.783)	(175.088)
Observations	3,580	3,580	3,580	3,580
Mean of Dep. var.	82.449	82.449	82.449	82.449

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.

Table: Levels results (Firm count)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy
Firm count	1.199	-0.257	2.505*	2.900
	(0.898)	(0.617)	(1.462)	(2.122)
Observations	6,086	6,086	6,086	6,086
Mean of Dep. var.	2.872	2.872	2.872	2.872

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.

Table: Levels results (Solar exports)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy
Solar export value (mill dollar)	22.1*	4.6	26.9**	31.9*
	(12.4)	(13.7)	(12.7)	(17.3)
Observations	4,654	4,654	4,654	4,654
Mean of Dep. var.	19.27	19.27	19.27	19.27

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.

Table: City-level total solar patents

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy
Patent	0.444***	0.114	0.662***	1.029***
	(0.150)	(0.138)	(0.213)	(0.219)
Observations	6,086	6,086	6,086	6,086

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.

Table: Outcome variable divided equally among plant locations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy
Panel capacity	1.415***	-0.052	1.816***	1.730**
	(0.505)	(0.282)	(0.547)	(0.745)
Observations	3,580	3,580	3,580	3,580

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Each observation is an admin2 level region and there are 358 admin2 regions in China. Time: 2004-2013. The sample is restricted to ENF production firms. The outcome variable is divided equally among the three plant locations listed in this database instead of being allocated to firms' headquarters.



Results: Quality-adjusted Patents I (Citation-weighted)

Table: Patent Citations (Aggregate ATT)

	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy
Patent citations	0.676***	0.388	0.854***	1.076**
	(0.218)	(0.328)	(0.300)	(0.482)
Observations	6,086	6,086	6,086	6,086

Notes: *0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. SDID on 358 cities 2004-2020. Outcome is IHS of patent count (weighted by future citations) by solar firms in a city-year pair. SE cluster bootstrapped by city.



Results: Quality-adjusted Patents II (Patent Type)

Table: Invention (High Value) vs. Design Patents (Low Value)

	Any Subsidy	Demand Subsidy	Production Subsidy	Innovation Subsidy
All patents	0.496**	0.236	0.871***	1.060***
	(0.200)	(0.275)	(0.227)	(0.367)
 Design patents 	0.186	0.277	0.237	0.151
	(0.138)	(0.216)	(0.173)	(0.253)
 Invention/Utility Model Patents 	0.529***	0.201	0.937***	1.097**
•	(0.201)	(0.274)	(0.232)	(0.373)

Notes: * p < 0.1, *** p < 0.05, **** p < 0.01. SDID on 358 cities (2004-2020). Outcome is IHS of patent count. Design patents are granted to a new, unique, and aesthetically distinctive design of a product. It specifically covers the shape, pattern, or combination of colors in an industrial product.



Classifying Patents as Learning By Doing/process innovation

- Liu (2023) classifies random sample of 3,299 Chinese solar patents into whether they are productivity improving (vs. product innovation) based on text [Sample patents]
- Use this as a training dataset to classify all our patents into these process innovations (so closer to LBD) using random forest algorithm
- Cross validate using 15% hold-out sample and find high (90% +) accuracy
- Using counts of this sub-sample as an outcome



Results: LBD Patents

Table: Learning-by-doing Patents (Aggregate ATT)

	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy
Patent	0.365**	0.187	0.604***	0.914***
	(0.149)	(0.186)	(0.235)	(0.377)
Observations	5,728	5,728	5,728	5,728

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. 358 cities with 43 treated. 2004-20. Outcome is IHS of "LBD" patents count



Placebo Non-solar Patents

Table: PLACEBO: CITY-LEVEL TOTAL NON-SOLAR PATENTS


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy
Patent	-0.064	0.004	-0.118	-0.034
	(0.438)	(0.965)	(0.309)	(0.811)
Observations	6,086	6,086	6,086	6,086

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Outcome is total patents (mainly non-solar) Each observation is an admin2 level region and there are 358 admin2 regions in China. 43 regions are treated by any subsidy. Time: 2004-2020. Each column is one sdid regression. The coefficient is the ATT which averages the staggered treatment effect. All regressions without controls






Characterising the control group



Potential pretrend






Calibration

Parame	ter	Value	Identification/Moments	Source
	Prefere	nce Parame	ters	
σ	Elasticity of substitution across energy sectors (solar vs non-solar)	3	(Jo, 2023), (Papageorgiou et al., 2017)	Externa
$\sigma_s, \sigma_{s'}$	Elasticity of substitution across power plant input varieties (e.g., solar panel models)	5, 8.18	(Shapiro and Walker, 2018)	Externa
	Production T	echnology P	arameters	
$\theta_s, \theta_{s'}$	Shape parameter of Pareto distribution (dispersion of productivity draws within energy)	3.5, 11.6	Sales revenue (ASIE, ENF)	Externa
$a_{o,s}, b_{o,s'}$	Location parameter of Pareto distribution	$e^{12.5}, e^{12.5}$	Sales revenue (ASIE, ENF)	Externa
$f_{s}^{e}, f_{s'}^{e}$	Sunk entry cost	1	Total output, solar & non-solar	Interna
$f_s, f_{s'}$	Production fixed cost	1	Mass of firms, solar & non-solar	Internal
$f_s^i, f_{s'}^i$	Innovation fixed cost	1	Innovator share, solar & non-solar	Interna
$_{o,s}, \xi_{o,s'}$	Productivity gain from innovating	1.06	Regression results	Externa
δ	Knowledge spillover parameter	1.4	Innovator ratio between solar and non-solar	Interna
	Trad	e Parameter	's	
τ_{ij}	Iceberg trade costs	1.4	Regression results	Externa
τ_i^x	Iceberg trade costs (foreign)	1.4	Distance model results	Externa
μ_s	Distance trade cost elasticity	0.32, 0.18	Monte et al. (2018)	Externa
$f_s^x, f_{s'}^x$	Exporting fixed cost	1	Exporters share, solar & non-solar (ASIE, ENF-customs)	Interna






Simulation Results: Number of Firms








Simulation Results: Revenue








Simulation Results: Quantity








Simulation Results: Price









Simulation Results: Aggregate


























Impacts of place-based PRODUCTION subsidies




Impacts of place-based PRODUCTION subsidies




Impacts of place-based PRODUCTION subsidies




Impacts of place-based INNOVATION subsidies



Impacts of place-based INNOVATION subsidies



Impacts of place-based INNOVATION subsidies



$$\Pi_{o,s}(\varphi) = \max \left\{ \underbrace{\sum_{d \neq \bar{d}} \left\{ \frac{(\sigma_s - 1)^{\sigma_s - 1}}{\sigma_s^{\sigma_s}} \frac{E_{d,s}}{\left(P_{d,s}\right)^{1 - \sigma_s}} \left(\frac{w_o \tau_{od,s} \left(1 - s_{o,s}\right)}{\varphi} \right)^{1 - \sigma_s} \right\} - w_o f_{o,s},}_{\text{Serves China, no innovation}}$$

$$\sum_{d} \left\{ \frac{(\sigma_{s} - 1)^{\sigma_{s} - 1}}{\sigma_{s}^{\sigma_{s}}} \frac{E_{d,s}}{(P_{d,s})^{1 - \sigma_{s}}} \left(\frac{w_{o} \tau_{od,s} (1 - s_{o,s})}{\varphi} \right)^{1 - \sigma_{s}} \right\} - w_{o} f_{o,\tilde{d},s}^{x} - w_{o} f_{o,s},$$

Serves China & exports, no innovation

$$\underbrace{\sum_{d} \left\{ \frac{\left(\sigma_{s}-1\right)^{\sigma_{s}-1}}{\sigma_{s}^{\sigma_{s}}} \frac{E_{d,s}}{\left(P_{d,s}\right)^{1-\sigma_{s}}} \left(\frac{w_{o}\tau_{od,s}\left(1-s_{o,s}\right)}{\xi_{o,s}\varphi} \right)^{1-\sigma_{s}} \right\} - w_{o}f_{o,\tilde{d},s}^{x} - w_{o}\phi_{o,s}\eta_{o,s}f_{o,s}} \right\}}$$

Serves China & exports, innovates



Model

Summary

- Demand for electricity decided locally (Nested CES)
- A local "Grid Planner" builds **clean and dirty power plants** (e.g. solar vs. coal) using **components** (e.g. solar panels) sourced across **multiple Chinese cities** (subject to transport costs)
- Local solar manufacturers have heterogeneous productivity.
- They make endogenous entry, exit, production, and technology upgrading (innovation) decisions
- Model provides intuition for differential impact of differentially targeted place-based subsidies (installation/demand, production, and innovation) on these multiple outcomes

Timing of Decisions

- Entrepreneurs pay a sunk entry cost (enter), draw productivity, and decide whether to:
 - 1 produce (stay in the market)
 - produce and export overseas
 - g produce, export and innovate
- 2 Three fixed costs (& associated productivity cutoffs):
 - production
 - 2 exporting
 - 3 innovation
- Innovation reduces marginal cost of production
- $oldsymbol{\Phi}$ Producing firms in origin city o serve multiple destination cities d paying iceberg trade costs
- 5 Demand for intermediates across all Chinese cities (and overseas) from different grid planners influences solar manufacturer decisions

Demand for energy sources

• In each destination city d, representative consumer utility from electricity services e_d :

$$U_d = u\left(e_d\right) \tag{1}$$

• Electricity services installed in each city by Grid Planner, who builds power plants combining output from a clean and dirty energy sector, s and s' (e.g. solar vs. coal):

$$e_d = \left(\kappa_{d,s} e_{d,s}^{\rho} + \kappa_{d,s'} e_{d,s'}^{\rho}\right)^{1/\rho} \tag{2}$$

Demand for energy sources

ullet Grid planner supplies as much energy as possible in the minimal cost way given income of representative consumer, I_d

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{e_{d,s},e_{d,s'}} \left(\kappa_{d,s'}e_{d,s'}^{\rho} + \kappa_{d,s}e_{d,s}^{\rho}\right)^{1/\rho} \\ \text{s.t. } P_{d,s}e_{d,s} + P_{d,s'}e_{d,s'} = I_d \end{aligned}$$

• Which yields our solar installation demand function, e_s^* :

$$e_{d,s}^{*}(P_{d,s}, P_{d,s'}, I_{d}) = \left(\frac{\kappa_{d,s}}{P_{d,s}}\right)^{\sigma} \frac{I_{d}}{\kappa_{d,s'}^{\sigma} P_{d,s'}^{1-\sigma} + \kappa_{d,s}^{\sigma} P_{d,s}^{1-\sigma}}$$
(3)

Demand for energy sector manufactured inputs (e.g. solar panels)

• To generate output for each energy sector, Grid Planner in city d combines intermediate inputs, $q_{od,s}(\omega)$ = quantity of variety ω manufactured in city o supplied to d using CES:

$$e_{d,s} = \left(\sum_{o} \int_{\omega \in \Omega_{o,s}} q_{od,s}(\omega)^{\frac{\sigma_s - 1}{\sigma_s}} d\omega\right)^{\frac{\sigma_s}{\sigma_s - 1}} \tag{4}$$

Demand for energy sector manufactured inputs (e.g. solar panels)

• To generate output for each energy sector, Grid Planner in city d combines intermediate inputs, $q_{od,s}(\omega)$ = quantity of variety ω manufactured in city o supplied to d using CES:

$$e_{d,s} = \left(\sum_{o} \int_{\omega \in \Omega_{o,s}} q_{od,s}(\omega)^{\frac{\sigma_s - 1}{\sigma_s}} d\omega\right)^{\frac{\sigma_s}{\sigma_s - 1}} \tag{4}$$

• To meet the optimal energy demand, grid planner chooses solar panels from all cities given their prices, $p_{od,s}$. This will determine price indices $P_{d,s}$ and $P_{d,s'}$.

Demand for energy sector manufactured inputs (e.g. solar panels)

• To generate output for each energy sector, Grid Planner in city d combines intermediate inputs, $q_{od,s}(\omega)$ = quantity of variety ω manufactured in city o supplied to d using CES:

$$e_{d,s} = \left(\sum_{o} \int_{\omega \in \Omega_{o,s}} q_{od,s}(\omega)^{\frac{\sigma_s - 1}{\sigma_s}} d\omega\right)^{\frac{\sigma_s}{\sigma_s - 1}} \tag{4}$$

- To meet the optimal energy demand, grid planner chooses solar panels from all cities given their prices, $p_{od,s}$. This will determine price indices $P_{d,s}$ and $P_{d,s'}$.
- Solving this constrained optimization problem gives a demand for each variety:

$$q_{od,s}(\omega) = \left(\frac{p_{od,s}(\omega)}{P_{d,s}}\right)^{-\sigma_s} \left(\frac{\kappa_{d,s}}{P_{d,s}}\right)^{\sigma} \frac{I_d}{\kappa_{d,s'}^{\sigma} P_{d,s'}^{1-\sigma} + \kappa_{d,s}^{\sigma} P_{d,s}^{1-\sigma}}$$
(5)

Solar Panel manufacturing technology

Production process:


- ullet Firms first need to pay a sunk cost $w_o f_{o,s}^e$ to operate
- After paying this cost, they draw their production productivity φ , from a Pareto distribution
- To produce, firms use a composite factor of production $L_{o,s}$ with unit cost w_o
- Producing $q_{o,s}(\varphi)$ units of a variety, involves a cost $w_o f_{o,s} + \frac{w_o q_{o,s}}{\varphi}$, where:
 - $f_{o,s}$: fixed cost
 - $\frac{1}{\varphi}$: marginal cost


Innovation/technology upgrading:

- Upon observing its initial productivity φ , a firm can upgrade its technology (innovate)
- By incurring a fixed cost: $\eta_{o,s}f_{o,s}$, with $\eta_{o,s}>1$, it reduces marginal cost to: $\frac{1}{\xi_{o,s}\varphi}$, with $\xi_{o,s}>1$




Results: Patents, Subsidy Types






Results: Production Capacity, Subsidy types




Notes: SDID on 358 cities with 43 treated. Cohort-year specific ATTs aggregated into event studies. Outcome: IHS of total panel production capacity MWh by solar firms in a city-year.


Treatment varies by panel. 95% SE cluster bootstrapped by city.


Results: Revenue, Subsidy types






Results: Firm Count, Subsidy types






Results: Solar exports, Subsidy types

Figure: Solar export value - Subsidy types





Notes: SDID on 358 cities with 43 treated. Cohort-year specific ATTs aggregated into event studies. Outcome: IHS of total solar export value of solar firms in a city-year.

Treatment varies by panel, 95% SE cluster bootstrapped by city.

Results


Table: Positive Spillovers outweighs Business Stealing (cf. Bloom, Schankerman & Van Reenen, 2013)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	All patents	Firm count	Revenue	Panel capacity	Solar export value
Any subsidy in an adjacent city	0.373***	0.099	0.617***	0.385	1.099**
	(0.096)	(0.055)	(0.199)	(0.263)	(0.491)
Observations	5,049	5,049	5,049	3,210	3,861

Notes: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.



Total subsidy value allocated to solar firms (1998-2013)





SDID analysis of impact on ASIE subsidies of introduction of policy

Table: Subsidy value (level)


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Any subsidy	Demand subsidy	Production subsidy	Innovation subsidy
Subsidy value (million RMB)	9.207*	-0.558	10.848*	15.351
	(5.267)	(1.250)	(5.644)	(11.179)
Observations	2,457	2,457	2,457	2,457
Mean of Dep. var.	1.608	1.608	1.608	1.608

^{ightarrow} These are: US\$1.2 million for any subsidy, US\$1.5 m for production subsidy, US\$2.1 m for innovation subsidy.



And this was in context of huge growth in solar production

Figure: Solar PV cell production 2000-2021



Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) & Earth Policy Institute



And this was in context of huge growth in solar production

Figure: World Solar PV cell production 2000-2021 (in logscale)

