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Gauteng 2055 Trend Paper: Population & Migration

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27 October 2008

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Gauteng 2055

Trend Paper: Population & Migration

1. Summary of Key Findings

Home to Johannesburg and Pretoria, Gauteng is the centre of South Africa's trade and transport networks. Responsible for close to 10% of the sub-Saharan Africa's GDP, it attracts business and people from around the country, continent, and beyond. The country's most-densely populated and second most populous province, Gauteng is also a primary destination and transit point for South African and international migrants.

Gauteng Province within South Africa



This short report summarises a variety of trends and concerns related to population trends in Gauteng. This includes fertility, mortality, and most forms of international and domestic movement into, through, and out of the Province.

Given its brevity, this report highlights only a limited number of migration's real and potential impacts. In doing so, it reaches four primary conclusions:

- First, while less politically fraught than cross-border flows, domestic migration (urbanisation and migration within the Province) has been and will continue to be the most significant and challenging form of mobility affecting Gauteng's development trajectory.
- Second, as long as Gauteng retains its pre-eminent economic position within the region, human mobility will remain a key characteristic of its socio-economic landscape. Indeed, given its catchment area, the Province's population is unlikely to stabilise in the near future. The more successful it is in generating

employment and combating poverty, the more people will likely move to its urban centres. This will remain so regardless of policies intended to slow or accelerate or domestic and international migration. Contrary to popular expectations, economic development and investments in rural areas or elsewhere in the region are likely to accelerate migration in both the short and long term.

- Third, provincial or national migration policies are unlikely to significantly affect the total numbers of migrants in the province. However, policy regimes (including implementation) will remain primary determinants of how mobility influences the province's developmental trajectory. An effective policy framework will not guarantee that migration will have positive economic or social effects, but it can promote material and social investment in the Province. Conversely, Gauteng's failure to develop and implement a well-informed and pragmatic approach to migration will ensure lost economic opportunities, insecurity, less accountable institutions, and a reduced ability to achieve benchmarks across a range of economic, social, and political fields.
- Fourth, migration can not be addressed effectively as a stand-alone issue. Nor can the Province address it on its own. Human mobility affects all economic, social, and political processes and should be incorporated into all projections and policy considerations. Effectively addressing migration will also require a coordinated approach that bridges departments and the three spheres of government. The Province is also encouraged to work with SADC and other bodies to develop an effective regional international migration regime.

2. Methods, Limitations and Migration Trends

Methods and Limitations

Migration, more than most other public policy fields, is subject to enormous discrepancies between knowledge availability and information needs. Moreover, data availability is no guarantee that it will influence policy decisions. These gaps are due to at least three factors: (1) the difficulty in accurately measuring migration given the number of variables and contexts; (2) its association with weighty and highly politicised issues surrounding nation-building, citizenship, and belonging; (3) the lack of personnel within and out of government trained in demography and other policy-relevant, migration related fields (see Landau 2007). Consequently, there is a paucity of evidence on migration within, into, and out of South Africa. What information exists is

often ignored or poorly used. These shortcomings are particularly evident at the sub-national or sub-Provincial level. The methodologically suspect ways and overt policy agendas affecting the collection of much of the available data further complicates efforts to accurately assess migration within the region. This means that the data and trends presented in this report should be considered as informed estimates.

This report primarily draws on data generated by the 2001 national census and the 2007 community survey undertaken by Statistics South Africa. It does not rely extensively on the 1996 population census because migration variables are of poor quality and not readily comparable to the 2001 census. In most instances, data collected to prior to 1994 are also largely unsuitable for the current project. Most of the data used in this report are publicly available through Statistics South Africa and could be explored further to greater benefit. This report also draws on proprietary data on inner-city Johannesburg collected by the Forced Migration Studies Programme (FMSP) at the University of the Witwatersrand. This latter data set is not representative of Johannesburg as a whole (or of the Province). Rather, it illustrates important themes and issues that are often absent from more aggregated data sets. The FMSP website provides a description of how these data were collected (see www.migration.org.za).

The population projections included here were made using the components methods. The approach emerged out of frustrations with the idea that a law was directing population growth. Consequently, geometric curves and then the more attractive logistic curves that predict eventual population stabilisation were largely abandoned. Instead, population growth rates are now calculated using three independent variables: fertility, mortality and migration. Given the Province's wealth and ability to secure food, energy, and other necessities, the projections do not include resource availability as a constraint to growth. The projections begin by artificially setting the age of the current population and exploring how it will be affected by variations in mortality, fertility and migration rates. The range of these variations are primarily due to uncertainty over the fertility transition, the evolution of the HIV epidemic and on access to antiretroviral treatment (ART). The measure and evolution of migration is more uncertain as it will depend extensively on events outside of the Province and, indeed, South Africa. However, as migration plays a tertiary role in the Province's population growth, this uncertainty has limited impact on the projections presented here (see graph. 4).

In the interest of space, the figures presented here are in schematic form. While improved accuracy is always desirable, it is worth noting that exact figures are not necessary to identify critical policy concerns, governance issues, and future research needs.

Trends

Current Population Parameters of Gauteng Province

- The Province had 10,447,100 inhabitants in mid-2008. Despite being the smallest by area, this is the highest population of any of the country's nine provinces (followed by KwaZulu-Natal). Not surprisingly, the Province is the most densely populated at, 631 inhabitants per square kilometre.
- Due to a strong (albeit relatively low) fertility rate (Gauteng fertility rate is 2.29, the second lowest after the Western Cape), HIV deaths, in-migration and the out-migration of non-working adults, Gauteng's population is relatively young. Most recent data reveal that 28% of the population is under 15 years of age compared with a 33% for the other provinces. Only 4 % of the population is over 64. (See Appendix One for a comparison of age by province).
- Gauteng has a productive population. Whereas 62% of the population is of working age (15-59) in other provinces, 68% of Gauteng's population is in that category. Moreover, the dependency ratio (people who are under 15 years old and more than 64 divided by the 15-64 year-old population) in Gauteng is 47% versus 62% in the other provinces.
- Reflecting a younger and more mobile population, Gauteng's average household size is 4.6 people per household. The other provinces collectively average 5.6 people per household.
- Household composition:
 - Share of households with only one individual (2007): 7%
 - Percentage of single-parent families: 22%
(37% of children live with a single parent)
- The population is not distributed evenly across Gauteng. Rather, it is concentrated in three of the six municipalities: City of Johannesburg (37%), Ekurhuleni (26%) and City of Tshwane (22%). Sedibeng, West Rand, and Metsweding together host only

14% of the Gauteng population. All the municipalities, except for the West Rand, have seen their population grow between 2001 and 2007. The highest growth rates concentrated in Tshwane and Johannesburg. Consequently, the population's spatial distribution is likely to become more concentrated before it equalises. These patterns are likely to continue although growth may equalise as infrastructure and economic activity becomes spread more evenly across the Province.

Composition

- The sex ratio (male population divided by female population) is 99%, showing that the former disequilibrium due to male migrant labour has been significantly reduced by the arrival of female migrants and natural growth. The relative increase in the number of women in the Province has also resulted in the heightened importance of natural increase over migration as the primary cause of population growth. As with the other sub-groups, women are not distributed evenly across the Province: inner-city areas in both Johannesburg and Pretoria remain markedly unbalanced in terms of gender ratios with significantly more men than women.
- In 2007, the Province's ethnic composition was as follows:
 - Black: 7,856,102 (75.2%)
 - White: 1,923,828 (18.4%)
 - Coloured: 390,188 (3.7%)
 - Indian/Asian: 281,595 (2.7%)
- Approximately 5% of the total population hold a bachelor's degree or higher diploma. An equal percentage of the population over the age of five have received no education. In most instances, international migration contributes to a more skilled population. According to FMSP data for inner city Johannesburg, the proportion of adults having finished tertiary education or holding a post-grad degree is 14.6% for the persons born in South Africa and 24.2% for the persons born outside South Africa. (See Appendix Two for a table comparing 'host' and 'migrant' populations' education achievement levels.) In many instances, the urbanisation of South African's has the opposite effect. Domestic migrants moving into the Province are less likely to be as well educated as those already here.

Population Dynamics and Trends

- Gauteng is a fast growing province. Between 2001 and 2007, Gauteng saw a population growth rate of 1.9%. This is the second highest rate after the Western

Cape. Consequently, the relevant weight of Gauteng province is steadily increasing relative to the country's total population. In 1996, Gauteng housed 18.11% of the country's total population; in 2001, the percentage climbed to 19.72. By 2007, the figure had climbed to 21.55%. Given Gauteng's economic importance within the country and the region, it will continue to gain in absolute and relative populations for the near future.

- Current data suggest that close to three quarters (74%) of the Province's population increase is due to 'natural growth'. In the medium term, natural growth is likely to remain the greatest factor in an expanding population. Due largely to the number of young (age 15-50) women, natural growth is expected to account for 68% of the population's increases in 2023. However, the total rate of natural growth will depend heavily on success in addressing HIV/AIDS.
- Because of its economically dominant position within both South and Southern Africa, Gauteng continues to be a major destination for domestic and international migrants. The net migration gain, (i.e. the difference between the arrivals and departures from the province) was 418,000 between October 2001 and February 2007. This translates into an annual gain of approximately 78,000 migrants.
- Although domestic migration accounts for the vast majority of new arrivals in Gauteng, the Province is also a primary destination for international migrants. In 2007, Gauteng Province hosted 46% of South Africa's population born outside South Africa. This is up from 42% in 2001 and is expected to increase in the years ahead.
- The trend for new arrivals is visible in the composition of the Province's 'non-native' stock. Of the total number of residents not born in Gauteng but residing within the Province, 16% arrived between 2002 and 2007. Most of the new arrivals are young adults born in other provinces of South Africa. FMSP data illustrate that in parts of Johannesburg, only about a third of the South African born population has lived in the city for more than 10 years.

Growth Projections

- Given the quality of available data and the relationship between migration and a variety of other variables (political instability in neighbouring countries, economic performance, HIV/AIDS, unequal spatial development, etc.), it is impossible to determine the Province's population growth trajectory. Recognising this uncertainty, we have developed three different scenarios for Gauteng developed bringing

together the primary determinants of population growth: mortality, fertility, and migration. The scenarios are based on different assumptions on the evolution of the three components until 2018, the variables being stable then until 2058. The growth rate is calculated afterwards. In line with current demographic methods, the growth rate is not held constant across the period.

Table One: Population Growth with Three Different Scenarios

Total population	Scenario		
	Low*	Medium**	High***
2008	10,447,100	10,447,100	10,447,100
2013	11,840,927	11,872,686	12,058,484
2018	13,166,049	13,266,482	13,737,467
2023	14,401,320	14,610,132	15,465,663
2028	15,593,029	15,916,425	17,195,974
2033	16,778,132	17,223,501	18,984,012
2038	17,939,862	18,516,113	20,806,917
2043	19,051,371	19,771,436	22,642,337
2048	20,273,501	20,965,214	24,462,607
2053	21,122,509	22,092,540	26,265,425
2058	21,923,066	23,158,858	28,058,961
average annual growth rate 2008-2058	1.49	1.60	2.00


Source: Mid-year population estimates 2008; Stats SA Community Survey 2007 Statistical Release; Mortality and Causes of Death in South Africa 2005; UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic 2008; Bah S, 2007, "Signification et utilisation des données de migrations internationales en Afrique du Sud durant la période 1970-2001" in *Les Migrations Internationales, Observations, Analyse et Perspectives*, Budapest International Colloquium, AIDELF, No 12, INED Ed.; Calculation by the authors.

* Fertility decreases to attain 2.0 in 2018; internal migration unchanged; international migration was underestimated but diminishes so we keep the official figure; mortality increases of 3 % every 5 years until 2013 (growth of the epidemic, slow down in the access to HIV treatment).

** Fertility decreases to attain 2.1 in 2018; internal migration unchanged; international migration unchanged but was underestimated, so the official figure is increased of 30 %; mortality unchanged (increase in HIV treatment access but growth of the epidemic).


*** Fertility unchanged (2.29 in 2018); internal migration unchanged; international migration increases and was highly underestimated, so the official figure is increased of 60 %; mortality decreases of -3 % every 5 years until 2013 (substantial increase in HIV treatment access in recent years and slow down of the epidemic).

Graph 1: Gauteng Population and Projection with Three Different Scenarios




Source: *ibid.*

Graph 2: Gauteng Population by Age and Sex, Medium Scenario mid-2023




Source: *ibid.*

Graph 3: Gauteng Population by Age and Sex, Low and High Scenario mid-2023



Source: *ibid.*

Graph 4: Evolution of the Nature of Growth using the Medium Scenario



Source: *ibid.*

As noted earlier, natural growth accounts for most of the population increase. However, should fertility decline, as projected, migration (mainly internal) would come to play a more significant role in the Province's population growth and spatial distribution. Because of the range of variables affecting population growth, it is almost impossible to predict the size or composition of the population past the next fifteen to twenty years and efforts to do so should be considered with considerable caution.

Domestic and International Migration

- As noted earlier, close to three quarters of the Province's actual population growth is due to natural increase. Of the quarter of growth accounted for by migration, only a small percentage is due to migration from outside the country.
- While migration is not the primary driver of population growth within the Province, it remains a significant variable. Relative to other Provinces, the proportion of internal migrants in Gauteng population is remarkably high: in 2001, it was 35.4% of the total population (3,129,438 persons). By 2007, that percentage climbed to 37.4% (3,852,222).
- Migration in Gauteng is mainly due to persons from other provinces of South Africa and there is no recent change in that distribution.

Table Two: Composition of Non-Gauteng Born Population (2007)

Type	Number	Percent of Migrant Population
Internal Migrants	3 852 222	87
International	578 387	13
Total	4.430.609	100

Source: Stats SA, Community Survey 2007

Table Three: Composition of People Moving to Gauteng in Past 5 Years (2007)

Type	Number	Percent of Migrant Population
Internal Migrants	609 169	86
International	101 899	14
Total	711 068	100

Source: *ibid.*

- Despite perceptions of a 'human tsunami' of international migrants headed towards Gauteng province, in 2001, the percentage of foreign-born residents in Gauteng was only 5.4% (477,201 persons). In 2007, the Province counted 5.6% (578,387) persons born outside South Africa. (Country of birth and citizenship were not asked on the 2007 Community Survey). Of these, two thirds were citizens of a SADC member

state. It must be kept in mind that improved enumeration methods may account for some of this growth. Nonetheless, number is certainly growing and is likely to continue to grow although not as quickly as many fear.

- In line with general growth patterns, the foreign-born population is not distributed evenly across the Province. In 2007, the foreign population in the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality made up 7.9% (304,353) of the total population. In some suburbs, the foreign-born population may comprise the majority. Elsewhere in the Province, the number of non-nationals is negligible. As such, the total foreign-born population has yet to approach percentages seen in global cities around the world. In cities such as London and Toronto, between 20-40% of the total population are foreign-born.
- Due to the expense of living in Gauteng and other lifestyle and economic concerns, there is also considerable out-migration from Gauteng Province. However, in-migration more than compensates for people leaving the province. See Appendix Three for more detail on these population dynamics.
- Given that the Province draws people from across the country, there is no reason to expect migration towards Gauteng to slow significantly in the years ahead. This differs from Provinces like the Western Cape that draw migrant populations primarily from the Eastern and Northern Capes (see Dorrington 2002). The matrix of migration between provinces shows that immigration to Gauteng is particularly important from the KwaZulu-Natal, the Eastern Cape and from bordering provinces.

Table Four: The Matrix of Origin of Migrants between Provinces 2001-2007

Province of destination	Province of origin									All regions
	WC	EC	NC	FS	KZN	NW	GP	MP	LP	
WC	0	54	5	3	7	1	25	2	3	100 (N=197,212)
EC	29	0	5	8	19	2	31	3	3	100 (N=85,392)
NC	20	6	0	10	3	43	17	1	1	100 (N=46,054)
FS	6	18	10	0	8	14	34	4	4	100 (N=67,832)
KZN	6	45	2	4	0	3	29	8	3	100 (N=124,276)
NW	3	16	4	15	4	0	40	6	12	100 (N=152,933)
GP	6	11	2	7	17	16	0	15	27	100 (N=609,169)
MP	2	7	1	6	13	5	27	0	39	100 (N=128,903)
LP	3	5	1	5	3	11	45	26	0	100 (N=7,1269)

Source: Stats SA, Community Survey 2007

- In addition to migration to Gauteng, people regularly move *within* the Province. According to the 2007 Community Survey, 18% of the inhabitants of Gauteng's inhabitants 2007 had moved within the Province since 2001. According to FMSP data for inner city of Johannesburg, the South African born population has, on average, moved twice since coming to the city. For foreigners, who have often been in the city for a shorter period, the average is slightly above three times. In both cases, these have tended to occur within a 5 to 10 year period.
- Non-nationals continue to move within the Province at a higher rate than South Africans do. The higher number of moves for foreigners is due to specific problems they face accessing housing, their vulnerability to eviction, and a tendency to see Gauteng as a temporary site of residence (see the discussion of 'transit' below). An FMSP study of the housing problems experienced by the foreigners in South Africa's main cities highlights serious problems of overcrowding, poor services (water, electricity, refuse) and, the xenophobia and exploitation by property owners and neighbours. A 2008 report by the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA) notes that large rental agencies and property owners are not aware of the differences between legal migrants (such as asylum seekers and refugees) and undocumented migrants. Instead, many believe that it is illegal to engage in a contract with refugees and asylum seekers. Others simply take advantage of migrants by extracting higher rents from a vulnerable population. Indeed, Wits data show that non-nationals pay a significantly higher amount for accommodation than South Africans even when controlling for income, legal status, and education constant.
- There is also considerable migration between communities on the border of Gauteng and Gauteng on a daily basis. Consequently, Gauteng should not only plan for its resident population, but must also consider the demands and contributions of those living just over the Provincial border. Of course, this must be undertaken in collaboration with neighbouring provinces and municipalities.
- Because of rapid movements into, through, and out of the Province, it is often inaccurate to speak of self-defined 'communities'. This has implications for a variety of service delivery concerns including health and housing. It also has significant implications for promoting civic participation and investment.

Transit Migration: Gauteng as Station and Destination

For reasons of location, infrastructure, intention and experience, Gauteng is as much a place of transit as destination. This transit takes multiple forms. The first is the continuation of long-standing patterns of circular migration from rural South Africa and elsewhere in the region, albeit now focused more around townships and urban centres. The second form of transit rests with traders and refugees who come to Gauteng seeking opportunities for profit or temporary protection. While often remaining for extended periods in the Province, their lives and interactions are typically conditioned by their interest in onward movement. The third type of transit migration is driven by those who see Gauteng as a stepping-stone or trampoline. The Province's wealth often attracts those who expect to accumulate the money needed for onward journeys. Many come hoping for contacts and social networks that will facilitate movement to other cities or countries. Still others hope to capitalise on the country's corrupt immigration regime that allows almost anyone with money to secure South African citizenship and documentation. With these documents in hand, travel to Europe and elsewhere becomes far easier.

Speaking of these various forms of transit is far simpler than measuring them. The emigration in the projections presented earlier is based on the self-declaration of citizens and permanent residents at the airport (weighted as recommended by S. Bah). While such figures are themselves problematic, they are far more accurate than the available data for temporary migrants who are not officially tracked. The long-term demographic impact of these departures may be limited by their temporariness. However, their presence—however transient—has important socio-economic and political effects on the communities in which they live.

In order to better reflect what is taking place, we have tried to answer two questions: Was Gauteng a second choice destination for the individuals who moved from another province or another African country? Do the migrants wish to settle in this province or do they see it as a transit place suitable to accumulate money to continue their journey to Europe or North America? Interviews with 847 people in inner city Johannesburg (part of the African City Survey) provides useful information on migrants' expectations before and after migrating to Johannesburg. The 2006 survey targeted migrants born in the DRC, Mozambique and Somalia. South Africans who migrated to Johannesburg were also included for comparison purposes.

- In the Wits University survey, 59% of the migrants considered Johannesburg as their final destination. This proportion is higher for the migrants from Mozambique (78%) and for the internal migrants (84%). In many regards, the migrants born in Mozambique have the same migratory behaviour as the internal migrants in South Africa. When the Mozambicans had considered other destinations, it was essentially Swaziland or a European country different from England (presumably Portugal). South Africans who migrated to Johannesburg hesitated initially with other destinations in South Africa. The migrants born in the DRC or in Somalia had considered moving to North America or England. The migrants born in the DRC had also considered another European country (presumably Belgium or France) and 6% of them said that they moved to Johannesburg thinking that it would be easier to move later to a third country.

Table Five: Expectations of the Migrants *before* Migrating to Johannesburg

Place considered before moving to South Africa	Place of birth			
	DRC	Somalia	Mozambique	South Africa outside Johannesburg
No specific plan	3%	23%	5%	1%
South Africa only	46%	36%	78%	84%
A third country also	50%	40%	18%	15%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: African City Survey, Johannesburg, 2006

- The migrants born in the DRC tend to see Johannesburg as a point of transit more often than the other groups. Of those surveyed, 30% expected to live in a third country in two years time. By comparison, 11% of the migrants born in Somalia expected to be elsewhere. Again comparing those two groups, 32% of migrants from DRC and 22% of the migrants from Somalia consider that their children should grow up in a third country.

Table Six: Expectations of the Migrants after Migrating to Inner City Johannesburg

Where respondent expects to live in two years	Place of birth			
	DRC	Somalia	Mozambique	South Africa outside Johannesburg
South Africa	44%	68%	60%	81%
Country of origin	13%	8%	20%	
Third country	30%	11%	4%	5%
Don't know	13%	12%	15%	13%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: *ibid.*

3. Driving Forces

- The primary driver of migration into Gauteng is the *perception* of employment and other economic opportunities within the Province. Consequently, efforts to deter migration are unlikely to succeed at changing general mobility patterns. Similarly, efforts to facilitate international and domestic migrants' access to documentation, social services, or accreditation are unlikely to substantively reshape domestic or international migration patterns. As illustration, the number of permanent residence permits issued by the Department of Home Affairs has declined by two thirds over the last twenty years; the level of immigration has continued to rise.
- Migration into South Africa (and Gauteng) is not only a result of events within South Africa. Rather, migration decisions are conditioned by *perceptions of relative security and opportunities*. This means that economic and political instability in neighbouring countries will directly affect Gauteng's population.
- In-migration to Gauteng will remain closely correlated to Gauteng's success in providing its current residents with economic and physical security. It will be impossible to reach Gauteng's 2055 economic and social goals without substantially increasing the number of migrants in the Province. The more successful Gauteng is at reaching its socio-economic targets, the more people are likely to come.
- In the short-term, economic growth elsewhere in South and Southern Africa is likely to *increase* migration into Gauteng. One of the greatest obstacles to migration is the cost of moving. As a population is able to gain a small amount of material surplus, many members of it are likely to invest those earnings in migration out of the hopes of achieving greater economic returns for themselves, their families, or future generations. This means that rather than slowing migration, business and service

investments business and services elsewhere in South Africa and in neighbouring countries will accelerate migration into Gauteng. Over the long-term, the emergence of secondary economic centres will act as attractors for potential migrants. While this may reduce the relative numbers of people coming to Gauteng, the absolute numbers will continue to increase.

- Although comprising a relatively small number of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers are attracted to Gauteng by a combination of economic opportunities, transport infrastructure, and the presence of two Home Affairs run Refugee Reception Offices (Pretoria and Johannesburg). These are the two closest offices to the Mozambique and Zimbabwean borders over which the majority of refugees enter South Africa. Should a proposed office in Musina become operational, a greater number of asylum seekers may remain in Limpopo although the absolute numbers seeking services in Gauteng are unlikely to decline.

4. Benefits of Migration

- Global and local evidence suggests that migration has generally positive effects on both aggregate economic performance and human development:
 - For people living in poorly serviced areas, moving to cities is the fastest and cheapest way to access to social services and economic opportunities.
 - There is a strong selection bias among those moving to cities: Those with the highest levels of education, health, and entrepreneurialism tend to move. Those who are poorly educated, infirm, or economically conservative are unlikely to move unless forced to do so. There is a positive correlation between distance travelled and the migrants' skills.
 - Gauteng has a massive 'skills gap'. Given the time taken to train South Africans and high rates of migration out of South Africa, international migration is the only viable mechanism to provide much needed skills to business.
 - There should be little fear of 'replacement' in the economy. While immigrants are typically willing to work for lower wages than citizens, ensuring that employers adhere to basic conditions of labour will reduce the demand for foreign workers and reduce the current dual wage system. To this end, non-nationals—regardless of immigration status—should be encouraged to join

unions and should have ready access to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), and other bodies that protect labour rights. Moreover, international migrants are far more likely than South African citizens to have experience living in urban areas. Many of these people come to South Africa with the hope of starting a business. Data from the FMSP and other sources show that in inner city Johannesburg, foreign migrants create far more jobs than they 'take.' A 2006 Johannesburg-based study by the Centre for Development and Enterprise underlines that foreigners are more than twice as likely to be self-employed and self-sufficient as local adult residents. Among those who start business, many ultimately hire others. In the CDE study, almost half of those hired were South Africans. In the FMSP Johannesburg study, the percentage was even higher.

- As the majority of immigrant entrepreneurs are Black, their presence helps to bolster the number of black owned businesses and, indeed, businesses and employment in primarily black suburbs.
- International migrants also develop trading links throughout the region. Through formal and informal transactions, South African made products are exported throughout the SADC region. Many people send remittances 'in kind' rather than in cash. This helps ensure that most of the money earned in Gauteng stays within the Province.
- In many instances, international migrants are operating the only shops in Township areas. This lowers the costs of acquiring food and other necessities for people living in those areas. In areas where migrants have been displaced by threats or actual violence, there are reports that families spend more for food. The distance travelled to secure commodities also puts people, often women, at risk of robbery or assault.

5. Governance and Institutional Constraints and Challenges

As migration affects all spheres of governance, it is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of governance challenges and constraints. Many of the issues that are broadly associated with migration—crime for example—are not a result of migration *per se*, but rather how government has responded to its various forms. For example, continuing to criminalise migration by providing no legal means for people from the region to move into South Africa means that police spend far too much time chasing

foreigners rather than fighting crime. As there is no evidence of foreigners' disproportionate involvement in criminal activity, this is a largely wasted effort.

The following outline a number of governance concerns. This list is intended to provoke further discussion rather than delimit policy responses. We also recommend that the Province critically review best practices (and failures) from elsewhere in the world (see, for example, the Metropolis Website listed in the sources section of this report):

- Recognise that **migration affects South African cities and provinces in substantially different ways**. In terms of internal migration, seven provinces are losing people while only two are gaining. This has resulted in population densification in and around Cape Town, Johannesburg, and Pretoria. International migration has similarly spatialised effects with long standing patterns of migration to agricultural and mining areas now overshadowed by movements into the country's primary cities. Similarly, many South Africans continue to oscillate between urban and rural areas or between urban centres. International migrants are also frequently in transit, moving frequently within cities and frequently returning 'home' or moving elsewhere. This results in still **unpredictable forms of investment, household structures, and political engagements**. This means that government can not develop a 'one size fits all' response.
- ***The challenge of mutual engagement***: The fluidity of migrant populations and the lack of incentive to engage with them on the part of political leaders make it particularly difficult to gauge their interests and intentions through mechanisms that build mutual trust. Given that migration is associated with heightening diversity (ethnic, racial, religious, and other forms), it is especially critical to build mechanisms that can span differences and resolve conflicts through political processes rather than vigilantism and violence.
- ***Lack of knowledge***: Cities are unable to draw on established data about their own citizenries and face even more acute difficulties in estimating the number of non-citizens in the cities. In the absence of sound data, myths about migration and mobility continue to inform policy decisions most of the time.

- ***Lack of intergovernmental coordination:*** In almost no instances have collaborations among government departments on migration matters been successful. This is not unique to migration, but is particularly evident given the need to develop multi-sited response mechanisms. Such coordination must not only be between Province and the Department of Home Affairs, but also among all spheres of government. It will be particularly important to begin considering the population dynamics of communities bordering Gauteng.
- ***Scapegoating, accountability, and service delivery.*** As long as government officials continue to blame foreigners and other in-migrants for the Province's social ills—crime, unemployment, HIV/AIDS, etc—they are unlikely to address the more fundamental structural issues underlying these concerns. While politically expedient, anti immigrant and anti-migrant rhetoric will ultimately lead not only to violence, but also to less effective and less accountable public institutions.

6. Dependency Requirements

- As noted earlier, migration can not be addressed as a stand-alone issue. Rather, it must be 'mainstreamed' throughout all policy arenas. However, doing so is made difficult by a number of factors. These include:
 - *The prevalence of anti-immigrant attitudes among policy makers.* In many instances, these are explicitly anti-foreigner. However, many policy makers continue to see the migration and urbanisation of South Africans as an equal threat. This is most evident when it comes to directing financial or human resources towards migrant issues. While there are political risks associated with being seen as 'migrant friendly', the long-term benefits of ensuring migrant populations are healthy and safe are likely to far outweigh the short-term costs.
 - *Lack of data.* Developing evidence-based policy (especially regarding spatial planning) requires accurate, dynamic, and spatialised data. The quality of existing data does not provide the basis for developing effective policy.
 - *Lack of internal capacity.* There is little capacity in any government department – including Statistics South Africa – to analyse migration data or to link migration trends with broader developmental priorities.

- *Lack of intergovernmental cooperation.* Government officials continue to see international migration as a Department of Home Affairs competency. While the DHA has an important role to play, it is cities and provinces that experience most of migration's immediate effects. Whereas the Department of Social Development has become engaged in assisting domestic and international migrants, few of the departments responsible for housing, health, or economic development have adequately considered the impacts of human mobility on service provision.

7. Further Research and Recommendations

- ***Develop policy frameworks recognising that migration and immigration are critical to South Africa's prosperity.*** Given the country's economic ambitions, ongoing efforts to foster regional integration, and acute skills shortages, immigration is critical to the country's international competitiveness. This is evident in the corporate sector, in all fields of knowledge production (research and development, higher education and technological and industrial innovation) but also in small business formation and tourism. Continued formal and informal restrictions on and mismanagement of immigration—including laws, administrative practice and widespread xenophobia—can only have a negative impact on the country's economic development. Reaping migration's positive economic effect will mean addressing migration management as a developmental rather than a security concern.
- ***Develop efficient interdepartmental data gathering and policy cohesion tools and capacity-building mechanisms.*** The inconsistencies in policy-making between the different government departments partly stem from a lack of centralised, reliable and available data and consistent data gathering methods across departments. Divergence of policy views, inherent to the various departmental mandates, would benefit from the creation of internal interdepartmental avenues to express these and explore better coordination. Capacity building emerges as one of the most critical dimension plaguing the management of migration especially within the Department of Home Affairs. Whereas addressing this issue is important within Home Affairs itself, only interdepartmental skills development across the public service, allowing staff in charge of migration to be aware of immigration control regulations as well as social, economic and human rights dimensions will foster a general improvement of migration management conditions.

- **Greater sub-regional convergence and coordination.** Although the regional implications of migration were beyond the report's scope, many aspects of the study point to the lack of sub-regional policy consultation, the reinforcement of bilateral rather than multilateral agreements, and the ineffectiveness of existing non-specific (SADC) and specific (Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa - MIDSA) platforms. The very limited scope of the Protocol on the Facilitation of the Movement of People in Southern Africa is emblematic of SADC's difficulties to counter-balance South Africa's political and economic weight in the region. A more regular and effective consultation with labour organisations (ILO, trade unions, labour recruitment agencies) and the private sectors at regional level is currently lacking despite recommendations to that effect already formulated in the 1997 South African *Green Paper on International Migration*.
- **Greater sub-national engagement in migration management.** While citizenship and asylum laws must remain national, there is a heightened need for increased attention to sub-national actors as they continue to assert their influence—through commission and omission—on the country's immigration and asylum regime. Municipal and Provincial authorities need to recognise that they can, and indeed should be encouraged, to actively advocate for an immigration regime that helps foster inclusion and service delivery for all residents for whom they are responsible. Moreover, this must be done in collaboration with officials in neighbouring municipalities, other spheres of government, and regional partners.
- **Adopting pragmatic approaches to service delivery.** Facilitating access to primary care clinics, life saving medical care, and legal services without regard to nationality or immigration status can help build safer communities and more responsive and accountable public institutions. There are, of course, significant cost implications of promoting such access. However, the long-term impacts of a healthier and better-educated population will compensate for initial investments. Moreover, by abolishing administrative distinctions among a population's sub-categories, the government can promote unity and community. Countering exclusion based on individuals' community of origin will not ensure secure and sustainable livelihoods, accountable institutions, and unified communities. It can, however, make achieving these objectives a possibility. Government should also not be overly concerned that providing services to migrants will promote additional movement into the Province. Few South Africans move solely to access services, let alone international migrants.

Indeed, many who need chronic care prefer to remain in 'home' areas where they can call on the support of family members.

- ***Developing a realistic understanding of the scope for policy reform.*** Current debates on migration and development are often premised on ideas that lowering barriers to human mobility reduce poverty. Apart from challenging the relationship between migration and poverty alleviation, we must be wary of naïve recommendations about migration policy reform. Within South African policymaking—as elsewhere—the development effects of migration (especially low skilled migration) are secondary to security concerns among citizens and officials. Moreover, even where policy reforms may be developmental, there is a need to recognise that South Africa currently exposes the limitations of its institutional capacity to overcome pockets of entrenched corruption in some of its administrations and to otherwise ensure policy priorities are uniformly translated into practice. A critical review of practices elsewhere in the world will reveal many of the possible policy options. Their applicability must then be considered within the current policy context.
- ***Conduct ongoing contextualised research.*** While it is useful to develop aggregated trends, responses and attitudes may be shaped by the particular racial, economic, and political history of a single neighbourhood. For local government, differences within the cities they are responsible for governing may be as important as those among cities. Developing context specific understandings will require heightening capacity for statistical, institutional, and social analyses. All spheres of government should be encouraged to collaborate and develop the capacity for data collection and analysis at all levels. Mechanisms should also be created to ensure that these analyses—when they eventually become available—are fed into decision-making processes. Only through such 'migration mainstreaming' can South Africa hope to avoid policy failures and help avoid current fears about the effects of human mobility on prosperity and security.

- More specifically, there is an acute need for better tracking of migration trends. These should not only include aggregate increases, but data on the following:
 - International and domestic movements into, within, and out of Gauteng
 - Length of residence at particular locations
 - Spatial distribution and population dynamics
 - Effects of migration on population's age, gender, education, health, and other characteristics.

- There is a need to move beyond counting and other descriptive data collection. Important data and analysis should address, *inter alia*:
 - Migration and access to services (particularly health, education, and accommodation)
 - Migration and social capital including issues of anti-foreigner sentiments and inter-ethnic conflict
 - Migration and investment in small, medium, and micro-enterprise
 - Migration and political participation
 - Migration and policing
 - National migration policies and local government responses.

8. Relevant Experts

- Mark Collinson, Agincourt Demographic Surveillance Site, Wits University
- Rob Dorrington, Department of Geography, University of Cape Town
- Simon Dugat and Anne Bernstein, Centre for Development and Enterprise
- Véronique Gindrey, Forced Migration Studies Programme, Wits University
- Pieter Kok, Human Science Research Council
- Loren Landau, Forced Migration Studies Programme, Wits University
- Sally Peberdy, Department of Geography, University of the Western Cape
- Neil Roux, Department of Social Development
- Aurelia Wa Kabwe Segatti, Forced Migration Studies Programme, Wits University

9. Main Indicators to Monitor Gauteng's Future Performance

In terms of monitoring migration-related issues, there are two broad areas for ongoing monitoring and evaluation: demographics and governance. The first relates to tracking the numbers and distribution of population within the Province. In this regard, success

should not be measured by the numbers of people living in the Province, but rather by the Province's ability to track and monitor these populations. Only by doing so will the relevant departments and officials be able to plan accordingly. As far as tracking migration within the Province, the following list of indicators should be regularly monitored and incorporated into future planning efforts. Almost all of these data are currently available:

- Population, Household Size, and Population Density per Suburb and Municipality
- Relevant Weight of the Province and Communities by Population and Composition
- Past Population Growth Rates,
- Fertility Rates by 5 Years Age Bands
- Mortality Rates by Sex and 5 years Age Bands
- Net Internal (i.e., Domestic) Migration Gain by Sex and 5 Year Age Bands
- Net International Migration Gain by Sex and 5 Year Age Bands
- Distribution of Population Gain over 5 Year Periods According to Natural Growth, Immigration, Migration, and Out-migration
- Number and Percentage of People with Foreign Citizenship
- Percentage of Non-Nationals with SADC Citizenship
- Numbers and Distribution of Internal/International Migrants in the non-Gauteng Born Population
- Matrix of Origins of Migrants between Provinces
- Dependency Ratio (People who are under 15 and over 64 Divided by the 15-64 year-Old Population)
- Education Achievement Status of Population

The second area of measurement is related to governance concerns. Here the emphasis is less on tracking demographic shifts and more on evaluating Government's ability to respond effectively. These indicators will, invariably, need to be refined in light of other planning objectives. As such, they are intended as a starting point for further deliberative processes:

- Degree to which the Province Has Developed Efficient Interdepartmental Data Gathering and Policy Cohesion Tools and Capacity-Building Mechanisms.

- Degree to which the Province Achieves Greater Sub-Regional Convergence and Coordination.
- The Effectiveness of Pragmatic Approaches to Service Delivery Evaluated by Improvements in the Total Percentage of the Population, Regardless of Origins, Who Access Critical Services
- Degree To Which Relevant Departments Have Mainstreamed Migration and Other Population Dynamics into Their Planning and Budgeting
- Level of Political Participation and Social Capital Among Various Population Sectors

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
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
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| www.migration.org.za | Forced Migration Studies Programme, University of the Witwatersrand |
| www.queensu.ca/samp : | Southern African Migration Project, Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) |
| www.cormsa.org.za | Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa |
| http://international.metropolis.net/index_e.html | International Metropolis Project |

Appendix One: Age Profile of Gauteng Province Compared with other Provinces (2007)




Source: Stats SA, Community Survey 2007

Appendix Two: Level of Education of the Local Population and Recent Immigrants to Gauteng Province (2001-2007)




Source: Stats SA, Community Survey 2007

Appendix Three (a): Internal Migratory Exchanges between Gauteng Province and Other Provinces (2001-2007)



Source: Stats SA, Community Survey 2007

Appendix Three (b): International Migratory Exchanges between Gauteng Province and Other Countries (2001-2007)



Source: Stats SA, Community Survey 2007; Stats SA Documented migration, 2003; Bah S, 2007, "Signification et utilisation des données de migrations internationales en Afrique du Sud durant la période 1970-2001" in *Les Migrations Internationales, Observations, Analyse et Perspectives*, Budapest International Colloquium, AIDELF, No 12, INED Ed.