The Initiative for Policy Dialogue
Migration Task Force Meeting
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MEETING SUMMARY

This summary groups relevant points from the presentations and discussion into six categories: (1) The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Migration and Remittances; (2) Drivers of Migration; (3) Migration and Development; (4) Social Impacts of Migration; (5) Migration and Human Rights; and (6) Migration Policy Making. These categories are based loosely on the research questions proposed for the Task Force meeting. Where the summary points are taken from presentations, the participant's name is followed by the title of their presentation; otherwise, the point was taken from discussion periods.

1. The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Migration and Remittances

Dilip Ratha ("Outlook for Remittance Flows 2008-2010") and Alfredo Thorne ("Impact of Global Financial Crisis on Mexico's Remittances") began the Task Force meeting by trying to assess changing trends in migration and remittance flows in the wake of the global financial crisis. Much of the conversation focused in particular on remittance flows to Mexico. For instance, Ratha noted that Mexican authorities released a report claiming that remittance flows had fallen 12 percent since the onset of the crisis.

Ratha made two main points in his presentation: that there has been a slowdown in remittances but not a doomsday decline, and that, although migration flows are weakening, migration stocks are not falling. Using data generated by the World Bank and assuming a recession through 2009 followed by a recovery in 2010, he projected only a slight dip in total worldwide remittance flows in 2009 (-0.9 percent) and then growth in 2010. In a worst case scenario, he said there might be a loss of up to -5.9 percent in 2009, followed by a return to growth in 2010.

In the presentations and the ensuing discussion, five factors emerged as key for determining the ultimate impact of the crisis on migration flows, remittances and their roles in development:

> **1) Relative economic importance of remittances in migrant-sending countries**. A slowdown in remittances will have a bigger and more negative effect in countries with a large ratio of remittances to GDP. In Tajikistan, Moldova and Tonga remittance flows are upward of 30 percent of GDP; these countries almost certainly will be more affected

than India, China and Mexico – the three largest recipients of remittances. Case study evidence presented later during the meeting, however, suggested that, even if large migrant-sending states might not be as affected by the slowdown as smaller states in general, certain regions within these states may be as affected as Tajikistan and other smaller countries. For example, migrant-sending states and municipalities within Mexico tend to be among the poorest in the country and therefore heavily dependent on remittances for financing basic consumption. **Irudaya Rajan ("Indian Migrants to the Gulf: The Kerala Experience")** revealed that migration from Kerala, India, to the Gulf states was majority-Muslim, implying that the Muslim population in particular would be impacted by a decrease in remittances back to Kerala. In addition, remittances are close to 20 percent of the state GDP in Kerala – as compared to just three percent of Indian GDP overall, and these remittances are 1.28 times the size of state government revenue for Kerala and four times the amount that the state gets from the central government. Ratha posited that remittances actually will become a more important source of finance in developing countries because private investment flows are falling and debt markets are tightening. Ratha argued, therefore, that, from a developmental perspective, this would be the wrong time for developed countries to restrict immigration: the more world markets become segmented, the harder it will be for countries to respond to the crisis.

2) **Exchange rates.** Ratha argued that looking at the uncertainties surrounding exchange rates is one of the most important things to consider when talking about remittance flows. Presenting evidence from Mexico that growth in remittances had slowed dramatically and even become negative before recently rebounding, he argued that exchange-rate volatility played a crucial role in determining the size of these remittance flows: the Mexican peso has gone from $10/USD in August 2008 to $13/USD at present. When Mexican migrants discovered in October that they had 30 percent more value because they were earning dollars, they had a "knee-jerk reaction," according to Ratha, and decided to buy assets in Mexico. This is consistent with findings presented by **Hyejin Ku ("Labor Migration as Price Arbitrage: Theory and Evidence from Mexican Workers in the U.S.")**. Contesting the notion that migration is driven purely by real wage differentials, Ku presented a theoretical model and empirical evidence from Mexican migration flows suggesting that real price differentials also drive migration. That is, both wage arbitrage and price arbitrage matter. If the exchange rate continues to overwhelmingly favor the currency of the host country, it may also be a determining factor for migrants to remain in the United States even if they have to switch to jobs that pay less than their pre-crisis jobs. Therefore, even as job opportunities deteriorate in host countries, return migration might be limited and remittance flows might remain more stable than a pure wage arbitrage model would anticipate. (**Benjamin Davis** commented that the wage gap between Mexico and the United States has been relatively static for the past 15 years, such that it cannot be the force driving migration. In his presentation, Alfredo Thorne, however, said that the wage gap had been steadily decreasing.) **Rodolfo de la Garza** contested the emphasis on economic factors driving migration, saying both in discussion and in his presentation that many Mexican migrants are driven by political factors (e.g. a lack of trust in their government).

3) Labor markets. Alfredo Thorne emphasized that labor markets both in sending and receiving countries influence the size of remittance flows and presented evidence regarding the case of the Mexico-U.S. migration corridor. Mexican migrants account for about 15 percent of the agricultural labor force in the United States and about 13 percent of the construction labor force. As employment in construction has collapsed as a result of the crisis in the housing market, remittances have dropped. In fact, the correlation between housing market indicators and remittance flows is much stronger in the recent past than previously. Presenting empirical results from a vector autoregression model, Thorne showed that U.S. productivity and U.S. employment are the most substantively significant determinants of remittance flows from the United States to Mexico; conditions in the Mexican labor market, in contrast, have a very small impact. Task Force participants debated whether employers would fire undocumented immigrants before native-born workers. Thorne expected that employers would retain undocumented workers, since they cost less, given that employers do not need to pay Social Security or other taxes for them. **Philip Martin**, however, said that employers often do pay Social Security taxes on undocumented workers and argued that the old rule of "last hired – first fired" tended to apply. He also spoke of heterogeneity within the U.S. construction sector: Mexican migrants tend to be hired in the non-union housing-construction sector, while native-born workers make up the vast majority of the labor force in the unionized infrastructure-construction sector. Additionally, the crisis might disproportionately affect smaller construction firms in which migrants tend to concentrate.

4) Immigration policies. Ratha argued that barriers to the movement of people, trade or investment will prolong the crisis. It seems that receiving countries are headed toward increasing such barriers. Thorne similarly argued that U.S. immigration policy is a structural factor driving remittances and migration flows. The number of illegal Mexican workers being removed from the labor force by U.S. immigration authorities has increased steadily from 2002 to 2007. Therefore, the tightening of immigration policy seems to have had an effect on both migration and remittances. (**Hania Zlotnik**, however, argued both that there has been relatively little change in U.S. immigration policies and that these policies have had a limited impact on migration flows, proposing that migrants come when there are jobs and stop coming when there are not jobs.) Restrictive immigration policies may also affect the channels through which migrants send remittances. Immigration enforcement might lead migrants to return to informal channels of remittance transmission, thereby disrupting remittance flows in some places and also, in terms of data collection, making these transactions harder to track. Ratha, however, emphasized that the choice between formal and informal channels is largely based on relative costs and said that, in general, reducing the costs of transfers encourages migrants to send more money. (Ratha also noted that discrepancies between official and black market exchange rates might drive remittances to be sent through informal channels, possibly reducing the total amount of remittances being sent.)

5) Practices of specific immigrant stocks. Remittances may remain stable during the crisis in certain countries even if the migration flow is weakening due to the contributions of older, better-established immigrants. However, this may not be true in all migration corridors, because as **Rodolfo de la Garza**, pointed out Latin American immigrants in the United States tend to send less money the longer they have been in the country. Ratha, however, said that there was not much evidence of remittance flows decreasing, perhaps because people continue to send the same absolute amounts even as their total income goes up, meaning that they just send a smaller proportion of their earnings. In his presentation, **Luis Jorge Garay ("Latin American Immigration in Spain since the 1990s")** asserted that Latin American immigrants to Spain have continued to remit at constant levels over the past 10 years.

Both presenters, as well as the commentator for the session, **Josh de Wind**, emphasized that a central challenge in assessing the consequences of the economic crisis on remittance flows is the lack of data and the unreliability of some of it. For instance, Ratha commented that Nigeria reported $18B in remittance flows in 2007 to the World Bank, whereas they had reported only $3B in remittance flows in the IMF balance-of-payments data. (Africa, as a whole, was reporting only $11B in remittance flows.) When asked why they were reporting $18B to the World Bank and $3B to the IMF, Nigeria updated the IMF number. But which number is actually correct? Ultimately, Ratha used growth rates from previous years to interpolate a figure of $9B, but given swings like that in reporting, he advised meeting participants to take all of the numbers with caution.

In general, Task Force members agreed with Ratha's conclusion that there has been a slowdown in remittances but that it is not the doomsday scenario found in the newspapers. There also was agreement that, while the flow of migrants is weakening, the stock of migrants is resilient and that these migrants will continue sending remittances – although the extent to which they will do so was controversial. Since remittances (estimated at $265B in 2007) are a multiple of official development aid (which is in the range of $100B), they will be an important source of capital for countries and localities coping with the economic crisis.

2. Drivers of Migration

As described above in relation to the financial crisis, Task Force participants debated the relative impact of several different push and pull factors determining migration flows, in particular relative economic opportunities and political factors.

Relative Economic Opportunities

At the individual level, **Hyejin Ku ("Labor Migration as Price Arbitrage: Theory and Evidence from Mexican Workers in the U.S.")** described how real price gaps contribute to driving migration. In her theory, migrant workers from a particular sending country are motivated, in part, by the value of the money that they can send home. This price differential between developed economies and developing ones will not change in the short term, thus providing a continuing incentive for migration.

Graeme Hugo ("Migration between the Asia-Pacific and Australia – A Development Perspective") and Graziano Battistella ("Migration from the Philippines: Between Development and Protection") focused directly on the idea of skill development and skill transfer in migration. Both presentations described a migration culture in sending countries.

Young people say that they want to be overseas workers when they grow up, and then they acquire the skills that enable them to become migrants. Hugo presented evidence that Asia-Pacific migrants to Australia overwhelmingly are in the highest occupational categories. (Over 50 percent of doctors in Australia are foreign-born; one-third from Asia.) **Victoria Gachitorena ("Global Forum on Migration and Development – Civil Society Days: Results and Recommendations")** said that business representatives at the Global Forum on Migration and Development spoke of their need for more skilled workers and described being hindered by restrictive immigration policies.

Magdalena Lesinska ("Contemporary Migration Processes in Central Eastern Europe: A 'Fluid' Type of Migration and Its Political Implications") described Polish migration in the wake of the 2004 European Union enlargement. After accession, a significant number of Poles migrated to the United Kingdom because of the poor economic conditions in Poland: the unemployment rate was at 18 percent, and the wage gap with the United Kingdom was very large. (Before accession, Poles had migrated mostly to Germany.) The post-accession migration led to a clear decrease in unemployment in Poland. The migrants were largely young, educated, and employed people, so this decrease was *not* an exporting of the unemployed: rather the unemployed in Poland assumed the jobs opened up by migration. In addition, she said that Polish migration was almost purely labor migration – as opposed to politically motivated migration.

Today, Poland is facing return migration motivated by the financial crisis. One-half of migrants in the United Kingdom from the 2004 accession countries already have exited – returning to their home countries or going elsewhere. People who have returned to Poland may then move on again to Norway or Denmark or back to the United Kingdom or Ireland. It might be that the seeming return migration is actually transitory migration. This is why Lesinska suggests the possibility of "fluid" migration where nothing is settled and nothing is fixed. No one expected this in 2004, although it has been facilitated by cheap flights and well-developed social networks.

Political Factors

Rodolfo de la Garza ("Making Billions Count: Human Capital Investments vs. Poverty Reduction") and Luis Jorge Garay ("Latin American Immigration in Spain since the 1990s") provided survey evidence of Latin American migrants to the United States and Spain that suggested individuals migrate in order to escape hostile political environments and take advantage of social services in the more developed economies. In the case of migration to the United States from Mexico, de la Garza said that migrants often cite corruption in government as motivation for leaving Mexico. In the case of migration to Spain from Latin America (a flow in which over 60 percent of migrants are female), migrants have cited a desire to improve their quality of life through access to better social services and also through access to more civil rights – women think that they can be more autonomous and have more freedom in Spain than in Latin America.

3. Migration and Development

Hein de Haas ("Migration and Development: Lessons from North African and Turkish Experiences") called for the Task Force to move beyond the positive/negative dichotomy of the effect of migration on development. He said that the impacts of migration are heterogeneous – for instance, how do we weight a reduction in poverty against an increase in inequality? – and also that we need a broader understanding of development. Migration might be good for a country's development or it might be good for individuals' own development. What is the appropriate level of analysis? From the point of view of the nation-state, brain drain seems bad for countries, but from the point of view of the individual, it is great for well-educated migrants who have more opportunities abroad.

According to de Haas, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia have emphasized the safety-valve aspects of migration and remittances. Since 1990s, migration has been more and more emphasized in these countries as a development strategy of "courting diasporas." This coincided with domestic political reforms in Morocco and Turkey: there was partial political liberalization in Morocco – increased pluralism – and economic reforms and growth in Turkey. Morocco has seen persistent out-migration and destination diversification, whereas Turkey appears to be transitioning to a period of return migration and new immigration. Remittances have surged in Morocco and declined in Turkey, but migrants have invested a lot in Turkey, taking advantage of opportunities for entrepreneurship.

Both de Hass and **Philip Martin ("Migration to the United States: Development Implications for Asia")** emphasized that migrants and remittances can neither be blamed for development failures nor expected to catalyze development. In the case of Asian immigrants in the United States, Martin argued that it is difficult to see these immigrants as an important factor for the overall development of their home countries, primarily because migrants are very small fractions of very large populations: one-tenth of one percent of the Indian and Chinese populations and 1.5 percent of Filipinos (as compared to 10 percent of Mexicans or 15 percent of Salvadorans).

Countries obviously have developed without migration. Temporary migration may seem like a win-win strategy that can benefit sending and receiving countries and also migrants themselves, but enforcement of temporary migration is quite difficult, particularly in democratic states. If immigration builds migrant capabilities, it gives them the ability to invest in their home states, but it also can lead to family reunification in the receiving state and therefore a total break with the sending country.

Graziano Battistella ("Migration from the Philippines: Between Development and Protection") similarly offered evidence from the Philippines that the impact on development of migration and remittances – even when they are substantive large – is marginal in the absence of other policies. Although remittances have increased over time, development in the Philippines has been disappointing. In 2007, remittances supplied approximately 30 percent of GDP, but GDP per capita grew only 0.4 percent, and the Philippines remains a low-capital economy. To bring about productive investment, reforms are necessary – protected, oligopolistic industries need to be reformed, and financial management needs to be improved.

At the level of individual migrants, **Talip Kilic ("Moving Up the Ladder? The Impact of Migration Experience on Occupational Mobility in Albania")** hypothesized that international migration increases upward labor mobility. Using a unique dataset (the 2004 Albanian Living Standards Measurement Study Survey) collecting the migration histories of Albanian adults and their initial and present labor market positions, Kilic showed that migration experiences promote upward mobility upon return. (The conclusion is robust to model specification and whether or not the sample includes certain age ranges or students.) Kilic proposed that international migration might improve labor market position through skill accumulation, new expertise obtained abroad or overseas savings. His research demonstrates a clear way in which migration might positively contribute to development. In terms of the ease of doing business, Albania has made progress because of the skills that return migrants add to the labor market. (Both **Hein de Haas and Josh de Wind**, however, questioned whether or not returned migrants were crowding non-migrants out of the workforce. Kilic acknowledged this possibility, saying that he expected the impact to vary by economic sector.)

Indeed, according to **Victoria Gachitorena ("Global Forum on Migration and Development – Civil Society Days: Results and Recommendations")**, return migration was one of the suggestions reached by the assembled civil society representatives at the recent Global Forum on Migration and Development. One of their four key recommendations was to encourage more circulatory migration, exactly to take advantage of human capital build-up by migrants for development.

For all the focus on migration as development-enhancing, it is also possible that migration might be anti-developmental. **Rodolfo de la Garza ("Making Billions Count: Human Capital Investments vs. Poverty Reduction")** vehemently argued that remittances do not foster development and, in fact, are more likely to underwrite failing states. He argued that the $25B in remittances that Mexico gets do not arrive as a single check and are not spent by the government – therefore, the effects are not the same as getting a lump sum $25B payment. He said that there was little evidence with regard to what remittances actually do and that no one had found evidence of remittances creating jobs or improving human capital in the receiving areas. (In response, **Ayman Zohry** called for a distinction between poverty alleviation and development – perhaps remittances alleviate poverty without spurring economic development at a national level.)

Ten percent of the Mexican population is in the United States, and 18 percent of Mexican citizens receive remittances. But ultimately 80 percent of Mexican immigrants decide to stay in the United States rather than bringing skills and additional capital back to Mexico. According to de la Garza, if immigrants invested remittance money in themselves rather than sending the money home, they would get better educations, better job training and better health care. Cutting off remittances, they would put pressure on their home state, and the Mexican government would have to start providing services and developing tax revenues. He emphasized that Mexicans were migrating because of state failures – understaffed schools, a corrupt police force and rampant bribery, for example – not for purely economic reasons. For de la Garza, this means that the most ardent protestors of the Mexican state have removed themselves from the Mexican political system and are living in Los Angeles, Houston and Chicago, where they are doing little to improve governance and accountability in Mexico.

In response, **Hein de Haas** questioned whether the alternative of some sort of social revolution really would be desirable in Mexico. He cited migrants from Somalia and the former Yugoslavia as having fueled civil wars in those regions. **Victoria Gachitorena** said that migration was a mechanism for improving the political awareness of Filipinos and that joint citizenship for Filipino migrants would help them apply the lessons on accountability that they learn overseas to their home government. But **Graziano Battistella ("Migration from the Philippines: Between Development and Protection")** pointed out that few Filipino migrants vote absentee and said that, between 2003 and 2007, only 50,000 migrants have reacquired Filipino citizenship. Later, **Victoria Gachitorena** noted that, according to World Bank figures, corruption has become worse in the Philippines during the time period when migration has been increasing and that the country did not qualify for money from the United States' Millennium Challenge Corporation because of a lack of progress in good governance indicators. **Graziano Battistella** said that the major reason for underdevelopment in the Philippines was not migration, as compared to the dictatorship of Marcos, natural disasters, ethnic turmoil, political upheavals, coup attempts and widespread corruption.

De la Garza also spoke of the costs of migration originating in migration-related crime, including theft, kidnapping and drug trafficking. He said that government officials do not subtract these costs when they are calculating the expected benefits from remittances.

As described above, **Graeme Hugo ("Migration between the Asia-Pacific and Australia – A Development Perspective") and Graziano Battistella ("Migration from the Philippines: Between Development and Protection")** both spoke about the out-migration of skilled individuals. (**Victoria Gachitorena** also noted this in her presentation.) This has led to a brain drain effect in the Asia-Pacific region in general and the Philippines in particular. In addition, there have been only limited remittance flows back to the countries of origin from Australia (since migrants to Australia generally have come from well-off families that do not need remittances); indeed, given the number of students coming to Australia, it is possible that overall capital flows linked to migrants are *positive* for Australia. (In the Indian context, **Binod Khadria ("Growth, Demography and Diaspora: Assessing the Role of Migration in India's Transformation in the 21st Century")** referred to this as "the silent backwash of remittances": each year $4B leaves India to finance students abroad.) The loss of teachers and doctors from small Pacific countries is having negative effects in those countries. Battistella said that despite a proliferation of nursing schools in the Philippines, there are shortages of nurses in the country.

This pattern of high-skilled out-migration was found elsewhere. **Loren Landau ("Mobility and Development in South Africa: Demographics, Dynamics and Policy Challenges")** similarly described South Africa's export of high-skilled migrants – about 1M educated South Africans have left the country (mostly from the white population) and gone to the United Kingdom, the United States and elsewhere. **Philip Martin ("Asian Migration to the United States: Development Implications for Asia")** described the high education levels among Indians migrating to the United States: 70 percent of those arriving in the 1990s had a B.A. And **Luis Jorge Garay ("Latin American Immigration in Spain since the 1990s")** said that Latin American immigrants to Spain tended to be well-educated with Argentine, Colombian and Cuban migrants having higher skill levels, on average, than the Spanish population. The Bank of

Spain claims that immigration has contributed 30 percent of GDP per capita growth in the past 10 years.

Talip Kilic asked about the extent to which these well-educated migrants were working in jobs below their educational status – "brain waste." In this regard, **Binod Khadria** cited the case of teachers from an agricultural university in India who were migrating to Sydney to become taxi drivers because they were being paid more as taxi drivers in Australia than as professors in India. **Hania Zlotnik ("International Migration and the United Nations")** said that it often was easier to see what receiving countries were getting out of migration, as compared to sending countries. (On the other hand, **Rodolfo de la Garza ("Making Billions Count: Human Capital Investments vs. Poverty Reduction")** spoke of Texas importing Mexican poverty and lowering its social indicators – such that it is ranked 48 out of 50 states in the "Chances for Success" index. And he noted drops in median income in areas where there is significant immigration.)

Although acquiring skills in Asian-Pacific countries has become directly related to leaving the country, **Philip Martin ("Migration to the United States: Development Implications for Asia") and Binod Khadria ("Growth, Demography and Diaspora: Assessing the Role of Migration in India's Transformation in the 21st Century")** importantly described the virtuous circle in Indian-United States migration, where high-skilled Indian migrants to the United States have returned to India after a period of time and set up their own companies. Martin also suggested a similar virtuous circle in China with migrants from Fujian province.

Hugo concluded his presentation by saying that the Task Force should focus on exploring the following question: Can there be a migration policy that does not compromise the goals of receiving countries but does take into account the possibility of development in the sending countries?

4. Social Impacts of Migration

The case studies suggested a set of contextual factors influencing the social costs of migration: the percentage of migrants in the workforce, the spatial concentration of migration at the sub-national level, whether migrants have freedom of movement or are mainly temporary or undocumented, and the political institutions in the host country.

The potential social costs of migration are perhaps greatest in the Gulf states – both to migrants and to host populations. As noted by **Ayman Zohry ("Migration to the Gulf Cooperation Council States")**, in some of the six countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), non-nationals comprise up to 80 percent of the population. Together, these states are one of the largest destinations for labor migration, hosting 12.8M non-nationals, representing one-third of their population. There is tremendous political and social tension in the GCC states because people are not content with this "invasion of foreigners." Twenty years ago, some states started nationalization schemes in order to decrease dependence on foreign labor. But these nationalization schemes did not work. Attempts to encourage banks to hire native-born workers, for instance, have resulted in banks preferring to pay fines rather than make 10 percent of their workforce national. These states do not allow for immigrants to incorporate as part of the political system. This has high costs for the children of migrant workers who are not granted the opportunity to be considered as citizens of the country that they have lived in for most of their lives. Migrants acquire no rights over their time in the country: a migrant who has lived in the Gulf for 20 years has as many rights as a newly arrived migrant. Task Force members agreed that this case study is important because the Gulf often is cited as a case of immigration management, but the model does not seem to be applicable for the liberal democracies of Europe and the United States. In comparison, **Victoria Gachitorena ("Global Forum on Migration and Development – Civil Society Days: Results and Recommendations")** cited Spain and Italy as countries that facilitate migrants gaining citizenship.

Irudaya Rajan ("Indian Migrants to the Gulf: The Kerala Experience") localized the examination of the costs of migration by studying migration from the Indian state of Kerala to the Gulf. Kerala has a population of 32M (as compared to the total Gulf country population of 36M). Of the 5M Indians in the Gulf, one-half of them are from Kerala. (If you go to the Gulf, you can get around using the native language of Kerala.) There also are a huge number of return migrants in Kerala – close to 1 million. One-half of those from Kerala migrating to other countries are Muslim; for Christian and Hindu households, the percentage is less than 20 percent. Keralans, on average, leave at age 28 and return at 44, spending 16 years in the Gulf. When they return, they often are self-employed. Only about 15 percent of migrants are female, although the proportion of never-married women who are leaving is increasing. Forty percent of the women who migrated in 2007 had never been married. The women who do migrate are more likely to have a college degree than the men who migrate. 1.2M women in Kerala are "Gulf wives" – their husbands are in the Gulf. They have social and psychological problems related to this. One out of five Muslim wives in Kerala has a husband working in the Gulf and is in effect a single mother.

In host countries, there can be a climate of fear surrounding migration. **Loren Landau ("Mobility and Development in South Africa: Demographics, Dynamics and Policy Challenges")** described this in South Africa. He said that there is a common refrain that, if South Africa lets people in, then soon the whole continent will be there – millions and millions of people. He pointed out that this fear has led to poor planning on the part of local governments: cities continue to plan as if migration is not taking place, estimating 2-3 percent population growth at a time when actual growth is 6-7 percent per year.

5. Migration and Human Rights

Susan Gzesh ("Human Rights and Social and Distributional Consequences"**)** provocatively proposed that migration is not a choice when it is in response to failed economic policies that make it difficult for people to live with dignity in their own homes. The modern human rights regime is based entirely on the principle that human rights transcend national citizenship. Therefore, she said, a human rights approach to migration would recognize a "right not to migrate." The human rights discourse on migration tends to focus on protecting migrant workers' rights, but Gzesh said that if we protect human rights in the first place, then we will not have migrants whose labor rights we need to protect in other countries.

The idea of having a “right not to migrate” was extensively debated during the discussion period. Members of the Task Force rejected what **Loren Landau** described as the “pathologizing of migration” – the assumption that migration indicates some sort of failure – and suggested that individual choice remains paramount. Discussant **Khalid Koser**, however, commented that both the Task Force and the literature on immigration in general are overwhelmingly focused on the three percent of the world that migrates and should also be looking at the much larger proportion of people who stay at home. He also said that it was important to think about international migration in the context of internal migration in sending and receiving countries.

Gzesh’s presentation also brought attention to the fact that the development and migration literatures tend to omit discussion of political rights. People who are not able to participate in political processes – including migrants in many countries, such as the Gulf states, as described above – are more vulnerable.

Hania Zlotnik, however, said that it was not necessarily states that were violating the rights of migrants so much as other private actors. **Victoria Gachitorena (“Global Forum on Migration and Development – Civil Society Days: Results and Recommendations”)** cited the seafaring industry in the Philippines as one where processes have developed to protect the labor rights of migrants. For example, employers pay recruitment and training costs, and workers have the right to return home on a regular basis

In contrast, **Ayman Zohry (“Migration to the Gulf Cooperation Council States”)** described the *Kafeel* system in the Gulf states, where a national sponsor is supposed to protect the rights of migrants. In reality, the system has hindered the rights of migrants and created a system akin to slavery, since the *kafeel* is responsible for everything related to the migrant, holding onto the migrant’s passport and prohibiting them from taking another job. Some shops will import labor only to provide it to another employer for a fee.

In his case study of South Africa, **Loren Landau (“Mobility and Development in South Africa: Demographics, Dynamics and Policy Challenges”)** addressed the issue of the political constraints that prevent migrants from having their human rights respected. Unskilled migrants have been entering South Africa from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia, and South Africa has been very aggressive in enforcing immigration laws. In 2007, the country deported 300,000 people – as many deportations as in the United States, which is five times the size of South Africa. Many of these were caught right at the border, while about 50,000 were caught in cities and deported. Of those migrants who remain in the country, many have trouble getting their children into school and are subject to extortion by the police, who refer to migrants as “mobile ATMs.” Politicians are capitalizing on public discontent and benefiting in their political careers by using migrants as a scapegoat for social and economic problems. Anger about the lack of service delivery has been channeled into protests that have concluded with migrants being killed.

Irudaya Rajan (“Indian Migrants to the Gulf: The Kerala Experience”) described restrictive laws in India that limit migration for those who are in their prime working years or do not have much education. **Susan Gzesh** said that it is contrary to all international human rights doctrines to have such exit controls. **Hania Zlotnik** said that the laws are intended to protect people from being exploited and that around 10 countries use them. **Binod Khadria** said that although the laws intend to protect migrants from exploitation, they have distortionary economic impacts. Rajan noted that the controls were dangerous because the use of emigration-control passports led to people being labeled as illiterate and uneducated and therefore discriminated against and exploited.

6. Migration Policy Making

Discussion of policy making touched on the decisions being made in the receiving states and the sending states and at the transnational level.

Often, the focus is on migration policy in receiving states. **Magdalena Lesinska ("Contemporary Migration Processes in Central Eastern Europe: A 'Fluid' Type of Migration and Its Political Implications")** described the variation in EU member state policies across the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. The vast majority of old EU members restricted migration from the new member states, using transitory arrangements. Sweden was the only country that decided both in 2004 and 2007 to not have transitory arrangements. The United Kingdom and Ireland opened their labor markets in 2004 but had restrictions in 2007. Finland had restrictions in 2004 but not 2007. Regarding these policies, **Binod Khadria ("Growth, Demography and Diaspora: Assessing the Role of Migration in India's Transformation in the 21st Century")** argued that long-term migration decisions – studying medicine or engineering – crucially depend on the rules in receiving states and that there consequently needs to be a guarantee from receiving states that a certain immigration policy will stay in place for a set period of time.

Looking at both receiving and sending states, **Hein de Haas ("Migration and Development: Lessons from North African and Turkish Experiences")** described the evolution in migration policy in North Africa and Europe. Before 1973, policies aimed to make migration temporary: receiving countries discouraged integration, and sending states encouraged migration from particular regions (through recruitment programs or passport controls). However, return programs failed. People did not want to go back to the poor economic conditions in their home countries, and the restrictive immigration policies in receiving countries made circular migratory flows difficult, effectively encouraging settlement rather than return. Recently, the Moroccan government has tried to catalyze return through propaganda, a crackdown on border corruption and personal welcomes by the king for returning migrants. In later comments, de Haas described French policy as emphasizing return migration in the interest of promoting developing in sending countries in order to reduce migrant flows. He said that this goal has made hometown associations in France skeptical of engagement with the French government. Whereas De Haas remained generally skeptical of policies aimed at enforcing return, **Talip Kilic ("Moving Up the Ladder? The Impact of Migration Experience on Occupational Mobility in Albania")** said that both civil society and government initiatives encourage the return migration of highly skilled Albanians.

Susan Gzesh pointed out that there is a tendency to think only of national migration policy, while, in the United States and elsewhere, local municipalities are taking it upon themselves to make migration policy – much of it quite restrictive. She also cited the positive example in

Illinois of a state-level immigration task force working to find legal immigrants who were not working in the professional roles that they had in their country of origin and for which there might be a need in the state (e.g. doctors, nurses or teachers).

Often policies seemed to be underdeveloped. **Loren Landau ("Mobility and Development in South Africa: Demographics, Dynamics and Policy Challenges")** described how South Africa is slowly realizing that there is a gigantic skills gap that must be filled by migrants from elsewhere on the continent but that there is no policy framework in which to accomplish this. Regarding the possible pro-development effects of return migration, **Graeme Hugo ("Migration between the Asia-Pacific and Australia – A Development Perspective")** said that it would take a major conceptual leap for the Australian government to encourage return migration, since the emphasis has been on getting skilled people to stay in the country. **Dilip Ratha** said that programs forcing people to spend their remittances on particular goods (e.g. tractors) have not worked – the goods end up not being used. He said that people need to be able to make individual decisions. As part of his argument that remittances are anti-developmental, **Rodolfo de la Garza ("Making Billions Count: Human Capital Investments vs. Poverty Reduction")** proposed that migrant associations in the United States should encourage migrants to invest in developing their own human capital rather than sending money back to Mexico.

Some policies have had unintended consequences. **Graziano Battistella ("Migration from the Philippines: Between Development and Protection")** described a law in the Philippines requiring that service workers receive a monthly salary of $400 or more. This has led to a decrease in legal migration, a change in migration destinations and an increase in illegal migration.

Thinking about how policy gets made in the international sphere, **Hania Zlotnik ("International Migration and the United Nations")** related the difficulties and complicated international political environment that constrains coordination at the global level. The High Level Dialogue on International Migration, which has been the largest and most important global forum on migration, is a telling case. Following the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo, U.N. member states were surveyed with regard to whether or not they wanted a conference on migration and what issues they were interested in discussing at the conference. By 2003, due to the shifts in the international political context (the Europeans were unhappy about positions being taken by the United States in the United Nations) a coalition in favor of a high-level dialogue emerged between the developing world and Europe. There were two main policy positions: sending countries wanted receiving countries to allow more migrants, while receiving countries – although they needed migrants – did not want that many. The Secretary General decided to make a recommendation for continued dialogue among governments through the creation of a Forum on International Migration – a forum *outside* of the U.N. structure. Of the 127 states participating in the dialogue, 80 expressed support; Australia, Bulgaria and the United States expressed their reservations. The forum first occurred in 2007.

Zlotnik concluded that analyzing these processes is important for understanding what is possible in the international arena: the results from such meetings are relatively toothless recommendations that everyone can support, such as "be nice to migrants."

Worried about the unintended consequences of international development policies, **Loren Landau ("Mobility and Development in South Africa: Demographics, Dynamics and Policy Challenges")** cited the World Bank's recent emphasis on spatial development – in which development funding flows to areas that already are doing well – as risking non-response to migrant interests.

In terms of what might catalyze additional international cooperation on migration policy making, **Graeme Hugo** cited the September 11th terrorist attacks as having been important for bringing the Australian government into dialogue with migrant-sending states; previously the dialogue has been mostly with the United States and Europe.

Wrap-up by task force directors

The uniqueness of each migratory system makes the migration-development relationship even more complicated, unresolved, unsettled, uncertain, critical and sometimes even unexplained. In order to start rethinking the causal mechanisms between migration and development, we need to take into account the multi-dimensionality of the flows (human, economic, cultural, social and political) both in positive and negative terms.

Migration is not a "silver bullet" and its impact on development is conditional upon which type of migration we are talking about (permanent vs. temporal; documented vs. undocumented), the "unit of analysis", local vs. regional vs. national and the structural conditions in sending societies. Without the right combination of public policies and private investment, migration per se, cannot do much.

An important point that was not particularly discussed during the meeting was the creation of a transnational space between migrant sending and receiving countries in which human rights, ideas, and culture gravitate between migrants and those left-behind. These aspects need to be taken into account when we think about the causal mechanisms between migration and development.

Finally, context matters. The context in which the migration-development relation takes place is going to foster or hinder the type of plausible government interventions and obviously the ability to implement them correctly. One possible avenue of success is the notion of co-development. What can each country do on its own and by cooperating? How can co-development address some of the market failures related to migration, such as the brain gain and brain drain?