

## CDB: Born Bankrupt, Born Shaper

Qiyuan XU










The Future of National Development Banks Carnegie Endowment, Washington DC, 19, April 2017,





#### **CDB** and China's transition economy



#### **Outline**

1 Born in a transition economy

**Born bankrupt** 

- 2 Born bankrupt in 1990s
- 3 An amazing turnaround

4 CDB as a shaper to itself

**Born shaper** 

- 5 CDB as a shaper to financial system
- 6 Concluding remarks

Appendix: as a counter-cyclical lender







#### **Transition in fiscal system**




Figure 1 Central government revenue was crowded out by local government: • in late 1980s and the beginning of 1990s •

Source: China's National Bureau of Statistics and WIND data, 2017.



#### **Transition in fiscal system**




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


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#### 2.2 Local government: with poor capacity to finance infrastructures




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


Figure 3: The mismatch between Local Government Revenue and Expenditure  $\mbox{\ensuremath{\square}}$ 

(In percent of general government revenue and expenditure, %)


Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China and WIND data, 2017.  $\ensuremath{\mathcal{P}}$ 





#### **Transition in banking system**

——policy bank business was separated from commercial banks in 1994





#### **Transition in fiscal system**

#### More centralized? 70 I. A shaper to itself: reforms II. A shaper to fiscal system: 1982 rebalancing Figure 3: The mismatch between Local Government Revenue and Expenditure (In percent of general government revenue and expenditure, %) Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China and WIND data, 2017. Commercial banks **ADBC ABC** CDB BOC CCB III. A shaper to financial market: benchmarks Six investment corporations: **Transition in banking system**





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




#### 2.1 CDB: a born bankrupt bank

1 total NPL ratio, 42.65%, in 1997

2 NPL ratio in coal industry, 75%, 1998



"sits on a mountain of bad debt"





#### 2.2 Local government: with poor capacity to finance infrastructures




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


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(In percent of general government revenue and expenditure, %)

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#### Two problems:

- 1 project based financing
- 2 in 1995, the Law of Guarantee was published.







#### 2.3 Central government: excessive intervention to CDB

#### CDB's balance sheet

#### assets

\* CDB's projects
were defined by the SPC
(State Planning Commission)
which is the predecessor to NDRC


#### liabilities

\* Bonds

PBoC forced CDB's bonds onto other commercial banks via administrative command



















































Figure CDB's Financing to People's Livelihood by 2015 (RMB bn)

Source: The Annual Report of CDB in 2015.





## 4 CDB as a shaper to itself






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







## 5.1 CDB as a shaper to fiscal system: LGFV

































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
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
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
# 5.2 CDB as a key player in monetary policy framework





# Appendix: counter-cyclical lender in fiscal policy framework










 Monetary policy 1: contributions to construct primary interest rate in two ways




CDB bonds issuance accounts a key portion of the market

- An application of Shibor: floating rate bonds based on Shibor, 74% of them are issued by CDB.
- CDB's interest rate itself as a kind of bench mark in the market





Monetary policy 2.1
 PSL as a tool of liquidity release








Monetary policy 2.2

PSL interest rate as a guide to long term interest rate





## **6 Concluding remarks**

#### CDB's revival resulted from

- the reconstruction of internal governance
- its function to develop a sound credit system and to shape the financial market
- the correction to the excessive 1994-fiscal-reform.
   Especially the rebalancing the fiscal capacity between the local and central government
- CDB works as a connection between the central government and local government
- ? The independence of a national development bank?





# Thank you!

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Born bankrupt, born shaper a story applies not only to CDB.

More shapers lead to more changes.

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


Figure CDB's counter-cyclical: net increase of loans

Source: the editorial board of The History of China Development Bank, 2013. And CDB's annual report in 2013. PBoC, 2016.





# Why LGBs are forbidden since 1994?

#### **Local government**

- Issue too much bond
- With zero interest rate
- Force the staff to buy

#### **Producer**

- Neglect promises and commitment
- Producer prefer to export <u>Local government</u>
- Local protectionism of the gov.

Public financial system in chaos

Private financial system in disorder



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Alibaba