Notes on Fiscal Federalism
These notes focus on the revenue side of fiscal federalism (tax assignments), intergovernmental transfers, and intergovernmental relations more generally.
These notes focus on the revenue side of fiscal federalism (tax assignments), intergovernmental transfers, and intergovernmental relations more generally.
This essay argues that appropriate assessment of the role of decentralization in China requires careful analysis. First, it is not just that the higher share of local government expenditure in total government expenditure matters, more crucially, higher local fiscal incentives in terms of higher marginal retention rates are important for inducing local governments’ support for local business development.
This short note asks where support for decentralization of taxation and spending decisions should come from in an economy with both inter- and intra-regional inequality. If an informational advantage makes local governments more efficient spenders, it follows that decentralization will imply higher taxes, ceteris paribus. Individual support for decentralization will thus depend on both individual and mean regional wealth levels, as well as on intra-regional inequalities.
In order understand the comparative theory of federal performance, the author develops a set of conditions that help differentiate among federal systems.These conditions serve a second purpose: the theory of fiscal federalism provides a set of systematic insights into the performance of federal systems. What follows can also be thought of as an attempt to make explicit some of the political assumptions underlying this theory.
These notes examine the economic and institutional arguments for decentralization as a means of identifying the conditions under which decentralization may or may not be successful. Burgess then offers some thoughts on how empirical evaluation of decentralization episodes can be improved and refined.
This paper explores how fiscal decentralization was an important aspect of China’s multi-faceted reform.
This paper covers the two main aspects of political decentralization in India, namely: (i) local accountability via village level elected institutions, and (ii) representation for women and other disadvantaged groups.
This paper adds empirical results from Latin America’s policy experiments to the current debates and sketches a few preliminary conclusions regarding both fiscal federalism and democratic practice.
The debate over privatization is essentially the debate over the relative efficiency of the state versus markets and private property in the allocation of resources. Where state intervention was previously justified on the grounds of market failure and other problems faced by developing countries in particular, privatization theory has viewed the state as the cause of inefficient allocation due to the vested interests of bureaucrats (or the possibility of states or public policies becoming ‘captive’ to the special interests of influential or powerful groups) and the lack of incentives in the absence of clearly designated property rights.
This paper discusses the assertion that debtors always want to repay their debts—because the cost of not doing so is extremely high; when in fact there is little evidence behind this assertion.